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COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING:
THE PROMOTION OF A HIGH LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT
AND THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD UNDER
ARTICLE 101
TOM C. HODGE*
ABSTRACT
The antitrust, or competition, regime of the European Union (EU) differs substantially from that of the United States, because EU competition
law forms part of the EU Treaties and is therefore imbibed with the multiple values of the European Union itself. Accordingly, it is by no means
clear or settled if the anti-cartel law of the European Union, Article 101
TFEU, must focus solely on a consumer welfare standard or must also
consider the broad and multiple policy aims enshrined in the EU Treaties.
If Article 101 must balance multiple aims, this would be in stark contrast
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, where the sole goal of consumer welfare
has long been established.1
This Article will seek to demonstrate that when an agreement is examined under Article 101, any anti-competitive impact that is detrimental
to consumer welfare must be balanced against the positive effect on the
policy goals of the EU (with the Article focusing particularly on employment issues). The Article further proposes that a “bifurcated balancing
approach” should be adopted, with economic efficiency concerns being
examined under Article 101(1) and broader policy goals being considered
in Article 101(3). The proposals made in this Article are not wholly without controversy, but are supported by the case law of the European Court
of Justice.
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MAHER M. DABBAH, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW 41
(2010) [hereinafter DABBAH, COMPARATIVE COMPETITION].
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INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU or the Union) has been described by former
Commissioner for Competition and current Commissioner for Digital
Agenda, Neelie Kroes, as “a radical experiment in the creation of open
markets.”2 Such a radical union lists among its aims: “[T]he sustainable
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price
stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress.”3 The question this Article seeks to answer
is whether the EU, being a union with such diverse political and economic
aims, can or should balance economic efficiency goals against other
broader public policy aims within its competition law regime.
In particular, this Article will examine Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article 101 TFEU is the
Union’s anti-cartel provision.4 Article 101(1) prohibits: “[A]ll agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the internal market.”5 However, such agreements can
be “excepted,” or exempted, under Article 101(3) if the agreement meets
four tests: (1) an efficiency test, (2) provides a fair share for consumers,

2

Neelie Kroes, Industrial Policy and Competition Law and Policy, 30 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1401, 1402 (2007).
3
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3, ¶ 3, Mar. 30, 2010,
2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do
?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML.
4
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
101, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:SOM:EN:HTML.
5
Id. at art. 101(1) (“The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the internal market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.”).
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(3) a test of proportionality, and (4) the agreement does not eliminate
competition.6
The wording of Article 101 sets out the bare legal bones of the EU’s
anti-cartel regime, but the Article requires the flesh of case law and Commission Guidelines and Decisions in order to make sense of what the aims
of Article 101 should be. This Article will seek to demonstrate, relying on
judgments and decisions, that the aims of Article 101 should be diverse
and not limited to only an economic efficiency aim. As will be shown, this
is in keeping with the structure of the TFEU7 and the case law of the European Courts—particularly the European Court of Justice (ECJ)8 and, to a
lesser extent, the Court of First Instance (CFI).9 Throughout the course of
this Article, the terminology “Court of First Instance” will be used, in spite
of the fact that the Lisbon Treaty changed the name of the CFI to the
“General Court;”10 this will be done for the sake of consistency and in
order to avoid confusion. It should also be noted that Article 101 was
previously numbered as Article 8111 in the Treaty Establishing the European Community which preceded the TFEU (and prior to that as Article
8512); as such, much of the literature, judgments and Commission documents refer to Articles 85 or 81, rather than Article 101. However, all such
references are equally applicable to Article 101.
6

See id. at art. 101(3) (“The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
— any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings,
— any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
— any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.”).
7
See infra Part IV.A.
8
See, e.g., Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van
Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1653.
9
See, e.g., Joined Cases T-528, T-542, T-543 & T-546/93, Métropole Télévision v.
Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-652.
10
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 2(2)(n), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].
11
See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 3.
12
See, e.g., Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 85, Mar. 25,
1957, 28 U.N.T.S. II.
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The significance of the aims of the Union’s competition regime cannot
be overstated. The ECJ has described Article 101 as “a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the
[Union].”13 More recently, Advocate-General Kokott has stated that the
EU’s competition rules are, “without any doubt a fundamental aim of the
Treaties.”14 Therefore, Article 101, and EU competition law in general,
have been given the responsibility of achieving not only economic efficiency goals, but also the broader aims of the EU.15 Accordingly, any
changes to the structure of the EU Treaties that promote or demote Union
goals have a tremendous impact on the functioning of Article 101 itself.16
As such, this Article will seek to demonstrate that the standard economic
efficiency test for competition law, consumer welfare, can be balanced
against the promotion of a high level of employment. Promoting a high
level of employment is required by Article 9 TFEU,17 and the structure of
the EU Treaties requires “consistency between [the EU’s] policies and
activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with
the principle of conferral of powers.”18 Therefore, this Article will establish that Article 101 must weigh the potential employment benefits of any
agreement against the anticompetitive impact that the agreement could
have on consumer welfare.
Determining whether there is a place for the promotion of employment
within a competition provision is particularly pertinent at this time. This is
not simply because the amendments wrought by the Lisbon Treaty downgraded competition as a Union aim and bolstered the position of other
public policy goals, such as employment.19 Additionally, the economic
climate of recent years has once again called into question “what kind of
society we are and should strive to be.”20 Is an economic efficiency goal
all we want from a competition regime, or do we want a regulatory system
that is more holistic and better able to consider what might benefit society
13
Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int’l NV, 1999 E.C.R.
I-3055, ¶ 36.
14
Case C-110/10 P, Solvay SA v. Comm’n, 2011 O.J. (C 161) ¶ 169.
15
See TFEU, supra note 4, at 50–58.
16
See infra Part IV.A.
17
TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 9 (“In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high
level of employment.”).
18
Id. at art. 7.
19
See infra Part IV.A.
20
Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 957
(1987).
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as a whole? As such, the “financial crisis provides an excellent opportunity to reflect about the economic orientation”21 of the Union, and to determine whether the EU’s competition system merely protects individuals as
consumers (that is, as purchasers of goods and services) or whether this
concern should be balanced against the individual’s role as a producer
(that is, when the individual manufactures or provides goods and services).
In order to demonstrate that not only should Article 101 consider, but
in fact must consider, the promotion of a high level of employment, this
Article will be divided into two broad parts. Parts I, II, and III of the Article will deal generally with the concept, and aims, of competition law.
Parts IV and V will focus specifically on EU competition law and will
demonstrate how consumer welfare and employment are to be balanced
under Article 101.
I. THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITION LAW
Competition law is not a new concept, nor is it a simple one. Competition laws can trace their origins back to Ancient Greece22 and Egypt.23
Before considering the development of competition law in the modern
world it is worth asking what competition is, and what competition law
does.
Competition is defined as a “struggle or contention for superiority.”24
Therefore, in a commercial marketplace, “[c]ompetition is about the
struggle by firms to achieve superiority over other firms.”25 The economics of competition law will be discussed below, in Part II;26 however, it
can be stated that competition reaps substantial economic benefits.27 Odudu identifies the benefits of competition as being “economic growth” and
better quality products being more widely available at a lower cost.28 It
can therefore be suggested that competitive markets are a “good thing,” as
21
Constanze Semmelmann, The European Union’s Economic Constitution Under the
Lisbon Treaty: Soul-Searching Among Lawyers Shifts the Focus to Procedure, 35 EUR. L.
REV. 516, 516 (2010).
22
See THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 5 (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 2d ed.
2007) [hereinafter Faull & Nikpay].
23
See LORENZO F. PACE, EUROPEAN ANTITRUST LAW: PROHIBITIONS, MERGER
CONTROL AND PROCEDURES 3 (2007).
24
RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 3 (6th ed. 2008).
25
ROBERT LANE, EC COMPETITION LAW 6 (2000).
26
See infra Part II.
27
See OKEOGHENE ODUDU, THE BOUNDARIES OF EC COMPETITION LAW: THE SCOPE
OF ARTICLE 81, at 10 (2006).
28
Id.
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Bishop and Walker wrote: “It is a generally accepted principle that competition is desirable.”29
If competition is a “good thing,” what role does competition law play?
The role of competition law is to prevent a “[l]essening of competition.”30
That is to say competition law protects the market from “artificial restraints”31 that might distort the “efficient allocation of resources.”32 Essentially, competition law involves itself in ensuring that private actors
(firms) do not seek to abuse their strength in the marketplace (either individually or collaboratively) by indulging in behavior that results in a profit
margin that is greater than that which the firm, or firms, could generate in
a freely competitive market.33 This concept of competition law is shown in
the law of the European Union, which prohibits the “prevention, restriction or distortion of competition”34 and the abuse of a “dominant position.”35
This suggests a difficult balancing act for competition law. On the one
hand, governments encourage competition in the marketplace; however, if
one firm succeeds in dominating their market, the firm risks coming under
scrutiny because of its success.36 This has caused competition law, or at
least the excessive use of it, to come in for criticism.37 Sautet levels the
accusation that competition law undermines the desire to succeed in the
marketplace by “chang[ing] the rules in order to protect some groups
against others.”38 Bork states that competition law represents “elaborate
deployments of governmental force” into the business world,39 which is
arguably inappropriate given that success in a free market requires entrepreneurialism and individualism.

29

SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW:
CONCEPTS, APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT 15 (3d ed. 2010).
30
Frederic Sautet, The Shaky Foundations of Competition Law, N.Z. L.J. 186, 189
(2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262999.
31
Erich Hoppmann, Workable Competition: The Development of an Idea on the Norm
for the Policy of Competition, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 61 (1968).
32
JACQUES PELKMANS, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: METHODS AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 224 (3d ed. 2006).
33
See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (2004).
34
TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(1).
35
Id. at art. 102.
36
See GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 4 (2007).
37
See id. at 2.
38
Sautet, supra note 30, at 190.
39
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 3
(1993).
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Clearly the concept of competition law, without even discussing its
aims, is not free from controversy.40 Accordingly, it is necessary to understand the historical background that gave rise to competition law in its
present form. The roots of modern competition law can be found in the
common law of England.41 Conduct that fell afoul of the common law of
competition was often described as a “restraint of trade.”42 Lord Justice
Bowen went further and explained when conduct violated England’s
somewhat haphazard and primitive competition laws: “[C]ompetition
ceases to be the lawful exercise of trade, and so to be a lawful excuse for
what will harm another, if carried to a length which is not fair or reasonable.”43 Although prohibiting conduct that is unfair or unreasonable is unlikely to be specific enough to guide future conduct, it does show that,
even at this early stage, the courts were seeking to use competition laws to
protect free competition in the marketplace.
Borrowing from English common law terminology, the Sherman Act
of the United States prohibited restraints of trade.44 In the United States,
competition law is known as “antitrust,”45 the reason for this being that the
Sherman Act had been passed specifically to combat business “trusts” (or
cartels).46 These trusts consisted of firms operating in the same industry—
cooperating to make price and output decisions collectively.47 The purpose
of trusts was to protect firms from the risks of failure inherent in a free
market.48 Looking elsewhere in the world, we see that the language of
competition is not unilingual. Germany has two “competition” laws: Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB)49 and Gesetz gegen den
unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG).50 The GWB, or Kartellrecht, can be seen
as the more familiar form of competition law and protects against re40

See MONTI, supra note 36, at 2.
See, e.g., The Case of the Tailors, 11 Co. Rep. 53a, 54a (1614); 77 Eng. Rep. 1218,
1220 (Eng.); see also The Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 615
(C.A.) (Bowen L.J.) (Eng.).
42
The Case of the Tailors, 11 Co. Rep. at 54a.
43
Mogul Steamship, 23 Q.B.D. at 615.
44
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
45
See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 30.
46
See id. at 3.
47
See id.
48
See id.
49
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB, Act Against Restraints of Competition], Aug. 26, 1998 BGBl. I at 2114 (2005) [hereinafter GWB].
50
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [UGW, Act Against Unfair Competition],
Mar. 7, 2004 BGBl. I at 254 (2005) [hereinafter UGW].
41
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straints of trade,51 whereas the UWG, or Wettbewerbsrecht, forbids unfair
competitive acts that are detrimental to competitors and consumers, including activities such as misleading advertising.52 In the Republic of
Korea, the primary competition statute is the Monopoly Regulation and
Fair Trade Act of 1980.53 The Slovak Republic’s national competition law
is the law on Protection of Competition.54 In France, competition law is
known as the “droit de la concurrence.”55 All this points to the fact that
“competition law regimes do not necessarily have to be consistently called
“competition law” for these laws to be capable of addressing the same
problematic situations or functioning as proper competition laws.”56
Returning to the nineteenth century origins of modern competition
law, it is worth noting that cartels were not unique to the United States.
Cartels were prevalent across Europe.57 In the German Empire they were
positively encouraged, as the government believed cartelisation would
protect Germany from foreign competition.58 World War I and its aftermath did not diminish the enthusiasm for cartels in Europe.59 In 1926,
Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Saar (then a territory
governed by Britain and France under a League of Nations mandate)
agreed to form an international steel cartel (Rohstahlgemeinschaft).60 Indeed, in 1930 the Briand Plan proposed forming a European Union “based
on economic cartels.”61
It was not until after World War II that continental Europe moved
away from the promotion of cartels. The U.S. military government in postWorld War II Germany introduced Law 56, which intended to eliminate
“concentrations of economic power.”62 Law 56 laid the foundations for the
51

See GWB, supra note 49, at 2114.
See UGW, supra note 50, at 254.
53
See ⓹㥄ἐ㥐 ⵃ ḩ㥉ᶤ⣌㜄 Ḵ䚐 ⷉ⪔ [Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade
Act], ⷉ⪔ 㥐3320䝬 [Act No. 3320] (S. Kor.).
54
See Zákon . 136/2001 Z. z. o ochrane hospodárskej sú!aže [Protection of Competition] (Slovk.).
55
See CODE DE COMMERCE [C. COM] art. L420-1 (Fr.).
56
DABBAH, COMPARATIVE COMPETITION, supra note 1, at 17.
57
See PACE, supra note 23, at 5.
58
See id.
59
See id. at 7.
60
See id. at 13; see also CHARLES S. MAIER, RECASTING BOURGEOIS EUROPE:
STABILIZATION IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND ITALY IN THE DECADE AFTER WORLD WAR I,
at 526 (1975).
61
PACE, supra note 23, at 15.
62
U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY PROCLAMATION NO. 56 Preamble (Mar.
1, 1947).
52
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growth of modern anti-cartel competition laws in Europe. It was because
of this early exposure to U.S.-style antitrust law that “German competition
lawyers trained in that postwar era for many years remained the intellectual aristocracy of the European competition bar.”63 The European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), formed by the Treaty of Paris in 1951,
began to spread competition/antitrust concepts across the continent.64 In
1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community
(EEC), and fifty years later the European Union succeeded the European
Community.65 The original competition laws laid down in the Treaty of
Paris—for those six Member States who were members of the ECSC66—
were to serve as the basis for the current competition laws of the twentyseven Member State European Union.67 European competition laws “can
be traced back, at least in their basic elements, to the articles dealing with
competition issues in the Treaty of Paris.”68 So Articles 101 and 102 of the
TFEU can show a pedigree going back to at least 1951, if not further, and
back to Law 56 of 1947.69
It is clear that the concept underlying competition law is, ironically,
the idea that regulation is required to protect free competition in the market. Furthermore, modern competition law came into being in the nineteenth century, and European Union competition law has existed since the
1950s.70 However, what is still not clear is what the aim, or aims, of competition law should be. Competition law can be defined as those laws
“which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in a
way that is detrimental to society.”71 Yet this definition is meaningless, as
it still does not expand on what aims competition law should have until
63

John H. Shenefield, Coherence or Confusion: The Future of the Global Antitrust
Conversation, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 385, 390 (2004).
64
See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13.
65
See TEU, supra note 3, at art. 1.
66
See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13 (the ECSC members were: Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany); see also The
Benelux, UK TRADE & INVESTMENT, http://www.invest.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/export/coun
tries/beneluxcountries.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
67
See TEU, supra note 3, at art. 52 (the Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
68
MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13.
69
See U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY PROCLAMATION NO. 56 Preamble
(Mar. 1, 1947); see also MOTTA, supra note 33, at 13.
70
See MOTTA, supra note 33, at 3, 13.
71
Id. at 30.
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there is clarification as to what exactly “detrimental to society” means.72
However, before considering the aims of competition law, it is important
to recognize the impact of economics upon the underlying theories of
competition law.73
II. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION
Although this Article does not seek to deal in detail with the economics of competition, it is necessary to consider economics because economic analysis underpins the law of competition. The European Union is a
relative newcomer to relying heavily on economic analysis when considering competition law issues.74 In-depth economic analysis of competition
law issues is historically more often associated with U.S. antitrust law.75
White explains that, by the 1970s, economists were actively participating
in U.S. antitrust cases, working for both the Department of Justice and
defendants.76 However, economic analysis has more recently begun to
play a significant role in EU competition law (Monti identifies the Green
Paper on Vertical Restraints77 as “the first serious and sustained attempt
to deploy economic analysis to [EU] competition law”).78 The adoption of
economic principles is because these principles provide “a coherent
framework of analysis” to “tell the most plausible story” in determining
“under what conditions anticompetitive outcomes are very unlikely, very
likely, or rather likely.”79 Monti attributes the late blooming of economic
analysis in European competition law to the fact that the EU is dominated
by Member States with civil law systems, and that the common law is
more open to accepting economic “consequentialist reasoning” than the
civil law, which favors “resolving problems by a literal interpretation of
the statutes.”80
72

Id.
See infra Part II.
74
See Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, at exec. summary 1, COM
(1996) 721 final (Jan. 22, 1997), 4 C.M.L.R. 519 (1997) [hereinafter Green Paper on
Vertical Restraints].
75
See Lawrence J. White, The Growing Influence of Economics and Economists on
Antitrust: An Extended Discussion 12–13 (N.Y.U., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 08-07, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1091531.
76
See id.
77
See Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 74, at exec. summary 1.
78
MONTI, supra note 36, at 82.
79
Faull & Nikpay, supra note 22, at 4.
80
MONTI, supra note 36, at 80.
73
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At the outset, it is important to note that economists have traditionally
considered the cornerstone of competition law and policy to be the promotion of “social welfare.”81 Social welfare is a state of affairs whereby economic efficiency is maximized, and the most benefits accrue to society as
a whole.82 However, social welfare is “value neutral (it values consumer[s]
and producer[s] ... equally)” which, “in practice ... leads to redistribution
from consumers to producers.”83 As such, economists have moved from
maximizing total, or social, welfare towards maximizing consumer welfare.84 Consumer welfare is a situation where economic efficiency is enhanced “in order to achieve lower prices, increase choice, and improve
product quality for the benefit of the consumer.”85 Aims of competition
law, such as consumer welfare, will be discussed below in Part III.86 However, for the present purpose—the economics of competition—it is important to understand what welfare standard economists use when analyzing
firm behavior through the lens of competition economics.
To consider the role of economics in competition law, the following
areas will be briefly discussed: (1) the economic efficiencies that competition law seeks to promote and protect, (2) the economic models of the
market, (3) market definition, and (4) market power. Market power is the
key to understanding the role of economics in competition law, and all the
other areas merely set the scene so that market power can be determined.
A. The Economic Efficiencies that Competition Law Seeks to Promote and
Protect
The efficiencies that competition in the marketplace encourages are:
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, and dynamic efficiency. Allocative efficiency (also known as Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or wealth maximization) is a state of affairs whereby the consumer
is able to purchase the product or service they want at the price they are
prepared to pay.87 This coinciding of product and price occurs because
manufacturers will continue to produce until the marginal cost (the cost of
81

BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 29, at 29.
Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987).
83
CHRISTOPHER TOWNLEY, ARTICLE 81 EC AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (2009).
84
See id.
85
MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY 52 (2003)
[hereinafter DABBAH, ANTITRUST POLICY].
86
See infra Part III.
87
WHISH, supra note 24, at 4–5; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 23 (2d ed.
2001).
82

2012]

COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING

71

producing an additional unit of output) and the marginal revenue (the price
that the manufacturer would obtain for a unit of production) meet.88 This
means that, in a competitive market, the manufacturer will continue to
produce until the production of additional units ceases to be profitable. In
other words, resources are allocated precisely according to society’s
needs, “as consumers can obtain the amounts of goods or services they
require at the price they are prepared to pay.”89
Productive efficiency has been described as “symmetrical” to allocative efficiency.90 Productive efficiency occurs when the manufacturer
provides goods and services at the lowest possible cost.91 This results in
society’s wealth being expended at the lowest possible level.92 In such a
situation, the manufacturer will not seek to raise prices above costs, as this
will result in customers abandoning the manufacturer and may encourage
other competitors to enter the marketplace.93 Additionally, a manufacturer
will not drop his prices below cost,94 as this will result in a failure to make
a profit.95
A final form of efficiency, “which cannot be proved scientifically,”96
is dynamic efficiency. This potential benefit of a competitive market results in innovation and technological development, as manufacturers will
compete with each other for a fixed number of consumer purchases.97
Of these three forms of efficiency, the one that competition most actively seeks to promote is arguably allocative efficiency. For Posner, this
is because competition laws are only capable of promoting allocative efficiency.98 Of course, a competitive marketplace is also likely to promote
productive efficiency, because manufacturers will seek to operate as efficiently as possible—in other words, to keep their costs as low as possible—or they will be driven from the market by their more efficient rivals.
However, while productive efficiency works as an economic theory of
firm behavior, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the law to pro88
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mote. It is possibly easier to promote allocative efficiency through encouraging competitive economic models of the marketplace. These economic
models will now be considered.
B. The Economic Models of the Market
In economic theory there are two extreme models of the marketplace:
perfect competition and monopoly. Perfect competition “bears little relation to reality”99 and “does not seem to be attainable;”100 as such, perfect
competition remains theoretical. A monopoly situation is possible but also
rare. In developed countries a monopoly is usually the result of government action; for example, the state legally creates a sole governmentowned company that monopolizes the defense industry.101 In developing
countries, monopolies are more likely to occur naturally because of the
national economy being dominated by a handful of “firms, individuals and
families” due to the “concentration of wealth within society.”102
It is under perfect competition that allocative and productive efficiency
will be achieved. This is because, in a perfectly competitive market, no
firm has the power to raise prices by restricting output; otherwise, a rival
firm will fill this void.103 Therefore, every manufacturer in the marketplace will continue to produce until marginal cost meets marginal revenue.104 However, perfect competition can only be theoretical because
achieving a perfectly competitive marketplace would require: (1) all manufacturers to be producing homogenous goods, (2) that the consumers
possessed all relevant information about the marketplace, and (3) that
there were no “barriers to entry” to prevent other manufacturers entering
the marketplace.105 In reality, goods are not homogeneous, especially
because manufacturers must promote their brand as unique or different to
secure and promote their market share. Equally, consumers are not completely informed about the market and, in almost all situations, barriers to
entry exist.106
Given that no market will be perfectly competitive, it could be questioned what purpose the theory of perfect competition serves to inform
99
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competition law. Although perfect competition can never be achieved,
competition law should seek to push markets in that direction to encourage
“the most effective use of scarce resources,”107 and because regulation of
the market can achieve workable competition.108 Workable competition
can be equated with effective competition; although, unfortunately, effective competition is a concept that Bishop and Walker are unable to formally define.109 To determine if a market is subject to effective, or workable,
competition requires “an analysis of the current structure of the market
and behavior of the firms within the market.”110 This is in keeping with the
Extended SCP framework of analysis, discussed infra.111
Workable competition cannot be achieved in a monopoly situation. A
monopoly is defined as: “[A] seller (or group of sellers acting like a single
seller) who can change the price at which his product will sell in the market by changing the quantity that he sells.”112 Essentially, a monopolist,
free from the restraints of competition, will not manufacture enough goods
to meet consumer demand; therefore, the scarcity of goods drives the price
above competitive levels. This results in supra-competitive profits for the
monopolist and reduced efficiency because “consumer demands are satisfied at a higher cost than necessary.”113 Lack of competition creates inefficiency in the marketplace, which harms society as a whole.
Workable competition falls into the final of the three models of competition: oligopoly.114 The oligopoly model most accurately reflects the
reality of the market, as it concerns the “interaction between a limited
number of firms.”115 The oligopoly model is of most use to determining
what economic functions competition law regimes should seek to achieve,
because the model recognizes restraints that perfect competition ignores
and, unlike the monopoly model, oligopoly recognizes that most markets
involve multiple firms engaged in the competitive process. Therefore,
“[t]he discussion of oligopoly models ... helps address what outcomes one
can reasonably expect effective competition to achieve.”116
Accepting the uses of the three economic models, and how they can
indicate what is achievable by regulation in order to foster workable com107
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petition, has resulted in economists taking a structural view of the marketplace.117 That is to say that economists came to believe that the structure
of the marketplace will determine how firms behave; for example, competition laws should concern themselves with ensuring that markets do not
become concentrated or that high barriers to entry are not established.118
This structural framework was developed by the Harvard School and is
known as the “Market Structure-Conduct-Performance” Framework (or
SCP).119 The Chicago School criticized the SCP framework, finding the
SCP too interventionist, and arguing that more reliance should be placed
on the self-correcting forces of competition, rather than regulatory intervention based on the structure of the marketplace.120 In spite of its disparagement, the Chicago School was unsuccessful in ridding economic
thinking of the SCP framework. Current post-Chicago analysis, however,
recognizes that market structure is potentially anticompetitive, but also
recognizes that this is just the starting point of any investigation into the
market, not the be-all and end-all.121 In order to determine anticompetitive
effects, market structure must be considered in conjunction with firm
behavior and firm performance (such as product innovation or the development of more efficient production methods).
C. Market Definition
Given that it has now been established that discovering anticompetitive behavior requires examining the relevant marketplace, it is worth
briefly considering how competition law defines the relevant market. The
market can be defined in three ways: (1) the relevant product; (2) geographic extent; and, possibly, (3) the temporal extent.
The product market is defined in terms of “interchangeability,” as confirmed by the European Court of Justice in Continental Can.122 Interchangeability is the extent to which goods are transposable with alternative
products.123 What interchangeability seeks to discover is whether bananas
117
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(for example) form a unique market of themselves or if bananas are just
part of a broader fresh fruit market.124 To identify the relevant product
market, the SSNIP test (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in
Price) is used.125 What the SSNIP test tries to answer is whether the customers of a manufacturer would switch to alternative products as a result
of a hypothetical, small (roughly five to ten percent), permanent increase
in price.126 If consumers would switch to the alternative products as a
result of the price increase, then the alternatives are included in the product market definition.127 Essentially, what the SSNIP test is seeking to
determine is whether alternative products or services “generate a competitive restraint” on the product in question; if the alternatives do exercise
such a restraint, then they form part of the relevant market.128
Defining the relevant geographic market can also be discovered by using the SSNIP test; for example, would the hypothetical increase in price
result in consumers looking further afield in order to buy alternative products? In many situations, however, the geographic market can be defined
more simply because some products are capable of being supplied
throughout the EU or even the world, whereas there are “technical, legal
or practical reasons”129 why some products have a more limited market.
There are also other reasons why a geographic market is limited to national boundaries or less, such as: “[P]references for national brands, language, culture and life style, and the need for a local presence.”130
Taken together, the relevant product and geographic markets attempt
to demonstrate how many products make up the relevant market and how
far the market for those products spreads. There is a third possible type of
market definition, which is the temporal market.131 Whish suggests that
markets can grow or contract depending on the time of year.132 The question of temporal markets was not dealt with by the ECJ in United
Brands,133 although the Commission did accept that a temporal market for
oil exists, following OPEC’s decision to raise prices in the 1970s.134
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D. Market Power
The purpose of the above discussion is all a preamble to the real concern of competition law: the “problems which may result from a firm or
firms possessing market power.”135 Market power is the situation whereby
the “constraints of competitive forces”136 have broken down; as such, the
firm(s) possessing market power can raise prices above the competitive
level “in a profitable way.”137 A firm, or firms, exercising market power
can cause a similarly negative impact as a monopolist, because they are
capable of reducing output and limiting consumer choice.138
The basis for market power is that a firm, or firms, can reduce their
output, and as such make profits at a supra-competitive level. There are
various factors that create the necessary conditions to exercise market
power, including possessing a high market share of over fifty percent.139
Under Article 102 TFEU, a high degree of market share is described as
holding a “dominant position,” and the ECJ has held that a market share of
fifty percent or more may well indicate dominance, or market power, in
relation to Article 102.140 The presumption of market power where the
firm has a large market share “has affinities with the SCP paradigm.”141
Bishop and Walker lists other factors that might be relevant to an assessment of market power, such as: “[B]arriers to entry and potential competition; barriers to expansion; countervailing buyer power; ... and the nature
of the oligopolistic interaction between firms.”142
The economic principle that determines if firms are capable of exercising market power is price elasticity of demand.143 Price elasticity of demand is the ratio of the percentage decrease in sales resulting from a given
percentage increase in price.
144
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In a market where there is a high elasticity, an increase in price will
lead to a decrease in overall profits. This is because the profit accruing
from a smaller amount of goods being sold at a higher price will not exceed the profit that was generated by selling a larger quantity of goods at
the original price. Market power is more likely to occur where demand is
inelastic, because an increase in price will not result in a large drop in
sales.
The elasticity of demand for the firm’s products will be influenced by
the competitive constraints upon the firm.145 For instance, a firm with a
large market share in a market where there is limited buyer power and
high barriers to entry is likely to have inelastic demand because there is no
viable alternative; accordingly, the firm can raise prices at will. Whereas a
firm in the opposite situation—in other words, with a lower market share,
strong buyers and low barriers to entry—will have a high elasticity of
demand and therefore cannot exercise market power.
Market power is an evil that competition law seeks to prevent by promoting workable competition. The foregoing consideration of economics
and competition law might suggest that preventing the abuse of market
power is the final, or ultimate, aim of competition. This is not the case,
however, as will be discussed in Part III below.146
III. THE AIMS OF COMPETITION LAW
“[A]ll competition decisions are subject to political debate.”147
As Bork famously stated, competition law cannot be understood until
it is determined, “[w]hat is the point of the law—what are its goals?”148 In
trying to answer that question, a ceaseless argument, “an evergreen ‘old’
debate,”149 continues to this day. Some scholars suggest that there is now
“a rough consensus on certain—but not all—core antitrust principles.”150
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However, others argue that there is “no consensus.”151 Accordingly, the
“battle for the soul of antitrust”152 still rages.
In order to understand the competition law of the European Union, a
variety of aims of competition law will be considered. First, the aims of
competition law across the globe will be briefly dealt with, in order to
demonstrate that no consensus has been reached as to the aims of competition law. Second, the consumer welfare aim will be discussed, as this is
recognized as the sole aim of U.S. antitrust law,153 and scholars on both
sides of the Atlantic have gone to great lengths to argue that consumer
welfare (or economic efficiency) is the only acceptable goal of competition law.154 Third, this Article will seek to argue that non-efficiency goals
can be incorporated into the aims of competition law. Finally, some of the
non-efficiency aims of competition law will be discussed in turn, namely:
fairness, freedom, and democracy; the protection of competitors; environmental considerations; employment; and single market integration within
the European Union.
A. Global Perspectives on the Aims of Competition Law
From a global perspective, it is arguable that there is no convergence
in international competition law. This is because “different systems of
competition law protect idiosyncratic aims.”155 As such, competition law
has been used to promote a variety of objectives, including: “regional
development, to maintain high employment levels, to protect home industry from foreign ownership or domination so allowing the growth of national champions and to protect industries vital to national military defence.”156
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This can be explained because “competition law is a function of its
context.”157 To put it another way, the aims of competition law are determined by the path dependency of the relevant jurisdiction. Path dependency is defined as meaning “that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific
and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it.”158 As such, history and ideology matter,159 because when it comes to competition law, “a
jurisdiction’s prevailing political mood—informed by history, culture, and
its view of others’ success— ... gives specificity to ... policy decisions.”160
As Furse writes: “Different regimes have emerged at different times and in
response to different pressures.”161 For instance, Korean competition law
was introduced partly in order to correct distortions that had occurred in
the economy “due to the government-led rapid economic growth.”162
Owing to the weight of path dependency, it is hardly surprising that
there is not a unified global goal for competition law. However, the OECD
has noted that “there appears to be a shift away from use of competition
laws to promote what might be characterized as broad public interest objectives.”163 Arguably, the OECD may be overstating this shift away from
public interest objectives and towards consumer welfare. As will be discussed below, European Union competition law recognizes multiple
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aims,164 as does the Canadian Competition Act, including the protection of
small businesses.165 Furthermore, even in developed nations, unbridled
free-market competition is not necessarily accepted with enthusiasm. As
Président Sarkozy of France asked in 2007: “Parce qu’en tant qu’idéologie, que dogme, qu’a donné la concurrence à l’Europe?”166
It therefore seems that the aims of the world’s various competition
laws are diverse and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future.
Despite this, there are calls, even demands, for convergence.167 Competition has been described as the “one area of the law in which we would
expect to see pressure toward the creation of a single standard.”168 This
convergence is inevitably considered to be towards the sole consumer
welfare standard adopted in the United States, as “advocates of convergence [believe] that jurisdictions should have similar rules and ones that
should follow those of the U.S.”169
From one perspective, it is easy to see why the cheerleaders of convergence aspire to push the rest of the world into following the United States’
consumer welfare example. The sole aim of the consumer welfare standard breeds certainty of outcome. In theory, businesspeople are better able
to predict outcomes when dealing with U.S. antitrust than with EU competition law. The uncertainty inherent in EU law “primarily result[s] from
uncertainty as to the purpose ascribed to Union competition law.”170 The
U.S. antitrust regime, therefore, is considered superior because outcomes
are more predictable and based on economic analysis; as such, firms are
better able to plan their future strategies.171 It has been suggested that the
United States has the most advanced competition law regime in the
world;172 accordingly, it can therefore be argued that it would be “best
practice” to adopt the U.S. consumer welfare approach. Finally, it could be
164
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argued that the wisdom of adopting a sole consumer welfare goal needs no
more evidence than the fact that, in 2007, China—the world’s fastest
growing economy173—“adopted consumer welfare as [the] goal” of its
competition regime.174
These arguments for convergence towards a consumer welfare standard are perhaps not as strong as they first appear. Although not a result of
adopting a consumer welfare standard, the U.S. system of antitrust litigation is arguably fraught with risk and uncertainty. In the end, antitrust
cases “are decided by lay jurors” and “the common use of class action
lawsuits in the U.S.[ ] makes antitrust cases highly risky for businesses
sued there.”175 Furthermore, U.S. antitrust law allows for treble damages
to be awarded against defendants;176 this could potentially be an incentive
to encourage baseless litigation. While the uncertainties created by issues
such as jury trials and class action lawsuits are not because of the adoption
of a consumer welfare standard, these issues do serve to illustrate that U.S.
antitrust is perhaps not a fount of perfect clarity.
The sole aim of the consumer welfare goal may well be “best practice”
in the United States, but that does not necessarily make it so for every
jurisdiction. This returns us to the issue of path dependency. A consumer
welfare standard is arguably better suited to “America because of its relatively stronger embrace of capitalism, than in Europe, where socialist and
ordoliberal thought is much more attractive.”177 What champions of convergence need to understand is that laws need to suit the societal and cultural norms of their jurisdictions. Transplanting law, or the aims of a law,
from one jurisdiction to another and failing to have regard for these societal and cultural norms is likely to be a recipe for failure.
173
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This continued failure to adopt consumer welfare as the sole aim baffles convergence advocates.178 In their article Antitrust Divergence and the
Limits of Economics, Devlin and Jacobs suggest that: firstly, the EU has
adopted the sole consumer welfare standard;179 secondly, “European competition law does not fully understand” business practices;180 and finally,
“a transatlantic chasm ... frustrates efforts to attain international harmonization”181 (that is, convergence towards the sole aim of consumer welfare).
Devlin and Jacobs’ first claim that the EU has adopted the sole aim of
consumer welfare can best be described as wishful thinking by those looking to find evidence of convergence. Although the European Commission
has made statements to that effect,182 the European Court of Justice explicitly rejected that idea in GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission.183 The second
and third statements are perhaps informed by the belief that, if competition
law does not serve the same masters as U.S. law, it is fundamentally defective.
This Articles seeks to demonstrate that, from a global perspective,
competition law pursues a myriad of aims and there is no sign of convergence. Shenefield has stated that convergence “can never happen; it will
never happen; and even if it could happen, it would in all probability be a
bad thing.”184 This is because competition law must “reflect[ ] the current
inherent socio-economic and cultural values” of their jurisdiction.185 As
hard as that might be for convergence advocates to appreciate, jurisdictions “should not be subject to criticism in comparison with the competition laws of countries with different values.”186 What this means is that
competition regimes can adopt multiple aims, which do not have to be
related to economic efficiency. However, as consumer welfare is perhaps
the most prominent goal in competition law, it will be discussed next.
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B. The Consumer Welfare Standard
Despite it being clear that consumer welfare has not been universally
accepted as the sole goal of antitrust, consumer welfare is an important
goal (or the sole goal) of many competition regimes, including the United
States and the European Union.187 The significance of consumer welfare
can therefore not be overstated, particularly when it is recognized as the
sole goal of U.S. law and a goal of EU law, and these jurisdictions have
“the most comprehensive and aggressively enforced antitrust laws in the
world.”188
In a sense, consumer welfare is just a short hand for economic efficiency, although it is a form seeking to maximize economic efficiency that
prefers the consumer to the producer.189 However, in the end, “maximising
consumer welfare and maximising social welfare give the same result.”190
Bork defines consumer welfare as being “another term for the wealth of
the nation.”191 For those who subscribe wholeheartedly to the consumer
welfare goal, the promotion of economic efficiency is “the only goal of
antitrust law.”192
The general benefit that is accrued from having consumer welfare as
the aim of competition law is that the consumer welfare standard “is the
best guarantee for consumers to be able to buy good quality products at
the lowest possible prices.”193 As consumer welfare reduces prices and
improves product quality, this has led to suggestions that the consumer
welfare aim benefits the poorest members of society: “[I]t is notable that
antitrust enforcement generally serves to help those at the low end of the
income distribution range without decreasing efficiency.... [P]rices will be
made lower in this market so that for any given income, however low, a
larger basket of goods and services can be purchased.”194 As mentioned
previously,195 consumer welfare is also believed to contribute to certainty
of outcomes. This is because the consumer welfare standard is based on
187
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economic analysis, unlike “nebulous social goals,”196 meaning that businesspeople can better determine if their firms are involved in activities that
competition authorities are likely to consider anticompetitive.197
Therefore, there are benefits to adopting the consumer welfare standard. As such, it is worthwhile considering why consumer welfare was
initially adopted in the United States; after all, consumer welfare was not
the original goal of U.S. antitrust law.198 Consumer welfare advocates
argue that consumer welfare is a better aim for competition law than other
goals because the consumer welfare standard produces results based on
economic analysis,199 whereas the other potential aims of competition law
are liable to be influenced by changing political considerations.200
However, the consumer welfare standard was the product of political
ideology.201 The Sherman Act never specified what the aims of America’s
antitrust regime should be.202 Accordingly, it fell to the courts to decide
those aims, and the courts settled on adopting an economic approach to
antitrust.203 An economic approach does not instinctively make consumer
welfare a value-free approach to enforcing competition law. The adoption
of consumer welfare, it is argued by Hughes, was the specific intent of the
Reagan Administration, which
pluck[ed] from academia many of the most articulate spokesmen for
the Chicago School approach and install[ed] them on the courts of appeals. The new judges, including Bork on the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook on the
Seventh Circuit, began to write opinions reflecting the Chicago approach, including the view that consumer welfare should be the exclusive focus of the law.204

Therefore, the consumer welfare standard is a not a value-free approach; while its reliance on economic analysis potentially might produce
greater certainty, the consumer welfare approach is an approach driven by
those who believe in the self-correcting abilities of the free-market. As
196

Furse, supra note 145, at 258.
Id.
198
See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428–29 (2d Cir.
1945).
199
BORK, supra note 39, at 91.
200
See, e.g., Furse, supra note 145, at 256.
201
BORK, supra note 39, at 84.
202
See POSNER, supra note 87, at 34–35.
203
Id. at 35.
204
Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Antitrust: What Fairness Means and Why It
Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 272 (1994).
197

2012]

COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING

85

such, the consumer welfare standard is more likely to reward or exempt
behavior of which its creators approve. For instance, the Chicago School
applauds potentially “morally repugnant” behavior, such as “an efficient
firm using any means at its disposal to drive a less efficient firm out of
business.”205 It can therefore be argued that the consumer welfare standard
is not an instinctively “better” aim for competition law than any other
standard, it simply happens to be the winner of the argument in the United
States, and to the victor go the spoils.
Consumer welfare became of increasing significance to the competition law of the European Union/Community from the beginning of the
twenty-first century onwards,206 although consumer choice and “consumers’ advantage” were considered decisive by the Commission as far back
as 1991.207 The European Commission has made repeated statements to
the effect that consumer welfare is now the sole goal of EU competition
law.208 However, the European Court of Justice has singularly failed to
recognize it as such, most recently in GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission:
[I]t must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the
structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such.209

Further, the Commission may now be backing away from their position of holding up consumer welfare as the sole goal of competition law.
The latest Guidelines released by the Commission do not mention either
consumer welfare or economic efficiency, and instead the Commission
merely states a purpose of “ensur[ing] that effective competition is maintained.”210
Consumer welfare is therefore established as a sole goal of competition in the United States, and a goal of competition in the EU, China,211
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Canada212 and Australia213 (to name but a few). Consumer welfare is now
so well-established that Whitman has written: “The primacy of consumer
economic interest has come to seem so self-evident that it hardly requires
any effort at justification.”214 Somewhat mockingly, Hughes describes
such statements as “a Möbius strip of rationalization” for justifying and
defending the consumer welfare standard.215
This blinkered assumption of the perfection of the consumer welfare
standard does not conceal the fact that criticism can be leveled against it.
Consumer welfare artificially divides individuals into two distinct categories: consumers and producers,216 but in reality, individuals are both:
“When a worker works, he is a producer; when he shops, he is a consumer.”217 As such, the consumer and producer distinction is not a clear one,
particularly because large public firms “are owned by shareholders,”218
therefore the consumer welfare standard may give to the individual when
he or she is a consumer, but take away from him or her when the individual is a producer or shareholder. It is because consumer welfare makes this
artificial distinction that it fails to appreciate that a sole consumer welfare
standard could actually be damaging to individuals. As Motta explains, the
consumer welfare standard may benefit the individual when that individual is acting as a consumer but will not produce an overall benefit for the
individual:
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[I]n today’s advanced economies consumers often own firms (partly or
fully), directly or through pension and investment funds. Accordingly,
dividends are distributed to a vast number of citizens who would be
hurt if profits were reduced. If the adoption of a consumer welfare
standard were intended to favour “citizens” as opposed to “firms,” it
would not be clear that such a goal would be achieved. Second, if one
took literally the objective of maximising consumer surplus, this would
lead to pricing at marginal costs, with firms exiting the industry in the
long-run or having to be subsidised to cover fixed costs .... Third, and
of great importance, lower prices and profits would have the effect of
depriving firms from the necessary incentives to innovate, invest, and
introduce new products.219

As such, there does seem to be a persuasive argument that consumer
welfare should not be the be-all and end-all when it comes to competition
policy, as it only accounts for benefits to individuals when they are consumers. This issue goes to the heart of the matter that this Article seeks to
answer. Consumer welfare needs to be balanced with matters that are also
of collective concern to individuals and society as a whole, such as employment or environmental protection.
The consumer welfare standard and economic efficiency have been
beneficial in defining the goals of competition law, but, like perfect competition, they remain just theories. Like all theories, consumer welfare
does not survive contact with reality. Clearly consumer welfare has an
important role to play, but it is neither the “‘correct’ position” nor the “last
word” in the aims of competition law.220 If consumer welfare is not balanced against non-efficiency goals in the application of competition law,
then the results could well be harmful to society as a whole.
C. Incorporating Non-Efficiency Goals into Competition Law as a General Proposition
The sole consumer welfare standard represents one end of the spectrum regarding the aims of competition law. At the other end of the spectrum is the view “that competition policy is based on multiple values that
cannot be reduced to a single economic goal,” and that these values must
“reflect society’s wishes, culture, history, institutions and perception of
itself.”221 This “multiple values” view of the aims of competition law is a
reflection of jurisdictional path dependency; as Townley states: “[L]aw
(and more importantly legal interpretation) is founded in country and cul219
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ture.”222 Dabbah lists various “social goals or values” including: (1) protecting small businesses, (2) protection of democracy, and (3) market
fairness.223 This section seeks to demonstrate that a more holistic approach
to the aims of competition law, which incorporates non-efficiency goals, is
necessary in order for competition law to benefit society.
If it is accepted that competition law should have multiple aims, the
question then becomes what aims should be included? Bork writes that
competition regimes that include multiple aims are “likely to leave the
impression that antitrust is a cornucopia of social values, all of them rather
vague and undefined but infinitely attractive.”224 Dabbah divides the aims
of competition law into three general categories: economic goals, social
goals, and broader political goals.225 Although consumer welfare advocates would like to do so, social goals and broader political goals cannot
be rendered as automatically inapplicable as concerns of competition law.
The aims that should be included in a competition regime arguably need to
be determined by each jurisdiction in order to be in keeping with the goals
and values of that society. For instance, the European Union has, since its
inception, used competition law as a way to prevent distortions in the
internal market, in other words, as a means for promoting market integration.226 As such, there can be no “one size fits all” guide to what aims
competition regimes should incorporate. What this Article seeks to argue
is that it seems clear that competition law should not merely aim at hitting
a consumer welfare target—with the possible exception of the United
States, where it appears that consumer welfare has laid down deep jurisprudential and intellectual roots and, accordingly, has become part of that
jurisdiction’s path dependency.
There are two arguments against incorporating non-efficiency values
into competition. First, values other than efficiency can create uncertain
outcomes or “fundamentally alter the final outcome”227 of an investigation
into allegedly anticompetitive conduct. This has previously been discussed.228 The second issue is whether non-efficiency aims are appropriate
to be considered as part of a competition law analysis.229 Odudu questions
222
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the legitimacy of incorporating non-efficiency goals into competition
law.230 In Odudu’s opinion, using competition law to “coerce virtues”231 is
undemocratic because such non-efficiency objectives should “be pursued
through democratic, political, legislative routes.”232 In support of his position, Odudu points to the U.S. Supreme Court decision of National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States.233 In National Society of Professional Engineers, Justice Stevens ruled that:
[T[he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and
services. “The heart of our national economic policy long has been
faith in the value of competition.” ... Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy
precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad.234

However, Justice Stevens is misstating the law. The Sherman Act does
not list the aims of U.S. antitrust law. The consumer welfare aim was a
creation of the courts, who were building on the intellectual foundations
provided by Robert Bork.235 Therefore, Odudu’s argument falls short. If
Odudu can accept that judges interpret competition statutes (which are
silent on the aims of competition law) to make consumer welfare the sole
aim of competition law, then there is no reason he cannot accept judges
interpreting statutes to give competition laws different aims. This is particularly true of the European Union, as Article 7 TFEU insists that there
is “consistency between [the Union’s] policies and activities.”236 As such,
as is argued in greater detail below,237 the EU’s competition law must
consider aims other than consumer welfare. Including aims other than
consumer welfare is not a “usurpation of democracy,”238 but rather, it is an
acknowledgement that competition law is part of a broader regulatory
framework; as such, competition law needs to work towards the same aims
as other laws that govern industrial policy.
Furthermore, Odudu’s argument is flawed for two reasons. Firstly,
consumer welfare advocates believe that focusing exclusively on consum230
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er welfare competition regimes “increase[s] welfare for the society as a
whole”239—in other words, that an efficient market will promote overall
welfare. Therefore, consumer welfare advocates assume that by aiming for
the goal of maximizing consumer welfare, this will generate nonefficiency benefits, such as consumer protection, promotion of employment, and others. The issue is that consumer welfare alone cannot benefit
society as a whole. Despite Kroes’ arguments to the contrary,240 it is irrational to suggest that non-efficiency goals can be incidentally promoted
through exclusion. In order to promote the multiple outcomes that benefit
society as a whole, all these aims must be considered together in a holistic
analysis.
This leads to the second flaw in Odudu’s argument, that such benefits
are arguably not “Townley’s values”241 but universal values. Although
some of Townley’s more extreme examples include using competition law
to discourage binge drinking,242 for the most part non-efficiency goals are
not extremist viewpoints. For instance, Article 9 TFEU requires that, “the
Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the
fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and
protection of human health.”243 Is Odudu suggesting that the majority of
citizens in a democracy are opposed to promoting employment or education? This author would submit that the answer is almost certainly not.
These are non-efficiency concerns that are arguably valid and widely accepted by members of a democratic society.
In order for competition law to function effectively, it needs to balance
broader aims against consumer welfare, otherwise competition law will
continue to be “out of whack.”244 To work towards improving society as a
whole and raising living standards, competition cannot be “only about the
survival of the fittest but also about the protection of the weak and the
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pursuit of important social goals.”245 To balance consumer welfare with
other objectives within competition law, this Article proposes a stakeholder theory of competition law. A stakeholder in a business is defined as: “A
person who has an interest in a business or enterprise, though not necessarily as an owner.”246 In terms of a stakeholder theory of competition law,
this would involve encompassing multiple aims that take into consideration the needs of businesses, employees, and the concerns of society as a
whole (for example, environmental protection, et cetera). Accordingly, the
aims of competition law should represent a coalition of interests and the
involvement of all relevant participants. As Stucke puts it: “[R]ejoice
when different stakeholders actively participate in shaping the objectives
of competition policy. One does not develop a competition culture by
cutting off the debate and entrusting policy to the experts. Such fiat is a
recipe for disaster.”247 As such, it seems clear that competition law needs
not only a soul, but also a heart. A competition law regime should not
function just on the basis of economic analysis, but should also consider
virtues that help protect and promote the living standards and quality of
life of a jurisdiction’s citizens. Consumer welfare does not go the whole
way towards achieving that end; non-efficiency aims must be incorporated.
D. Fairness, Freedom, and Democracy
Fairness, freedom, and the promotion and defense of democracy
through competition law can largely be traced back to the German Freiburg School.248 The Freiburg School developed a philosophy “based on
the values of personal liberty and equality.”249 From an ordoliberal perspective, “freedom is the ultimate goal” of competition law.250
Freedom is the most fundamental goal of competition law for ordoliberals.251 Economic freedom is closely linked with the protection of fairness and democracy because “the protection of individual freedom of
action ... restrain[s] undue economic power.”252 By restraining over245
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whelming economic power, “individuals are free to participate”253 in markets and are given ample opportunity to seek their own role in society.
Economic freedom was held to be an aim of U.S. antitrust law; in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States the Supreme Court stated: “The
Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition.”254
The aim of economic freedom has come in for criticism because, in
order to ensure the economic freedom demanded by ordoliberals, it would
require the destruction of all contractual relationships.255 This problem
with the economic freedom aim, if taken to its logical extreme, has been
highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court.256 As Justice Brandeis pointed
out, “[e]very agreement concerning trade ... restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence.”257 Accordingly, U.S. antitrust law only prohibits
“unreasonable restraint[s] of trade.”258
As such, economic freedom is not without its flaws. If total economic
freedom was achieved, it would lead to anarchy in the marketplace; however, freedom does inform the thinking behind the non-efficiency goals of
fairness and democracy. Fairness will be considered first. Fairness is
linked to freedom since it stems “from our beliefs in free will, responsibility, autonomy, [and] equality.”259 Hughes believes that “fairness is a
ratifying process” in that “[t]he competitors who achieve success thereby
prove that they deserve it.”260 Fairness requires “firms to behave in a certain way both with respect to customers and to rivals,”261 meaning that
firms cannot resort to unprincipled tactics in order to compete in the marketplace. The main examples of unfair conduct are predatory pricing and
refusal to supply (in some circumstances).
Predatory pricing is when a dominant firm, or group of firms, “reduces
prices to a loss-making level” in order to discipline or drive a competitor
out of the marketplace.262 Once the competitor has ceased to be a threat,
253
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the dominant firm will then raise prices above competitive levels.263 Predatory pricing may be unfair to competitors, but arguably promotes consumer welfare by lowering prices: “[C]utting prices in order to increase
business often is the very essence of competition.”264 Given the potential
benefits of predatory pricing to consumers, both the U.S. Supreme
Court265 and the Privy Council (for New Zealand)266 have held that, in
order to prove predatory pricing is harmful, evidence must be presented
that the dominant firm is capable of recouping the losses incurred through
predatory pricing in the long run. However, the ECJ has taken a comparatively harsh view towards identifying conduct as predatory pricing: in
AKZO v. Commission the Court made clear that firms engaged in predatory pricing would be punished.267 Furthermore, the ECJ does not require
proof that the dominant firm is able to recoup its losses in order to prove
predatory pricing.268 Predatory pricing can be seen as falling within the
consumer welfare paradigm; if predatory pricing successfully forces competitors out of the market, then the remaining firm(s) can raise prices to
supra-competitive. However, prohibitions against predatory pricing are
more about fairness than consumer welfare. It is unfair to force competitors out of the marketplace by driving them out of business with artificially low prices, therefore denying them their economic freedom to participate in the marketplace.
Refusal to supply is restricted to limited sets of circumstances and, for
the most part, contract law does not insist upon “compulsory dealing.”269
One situation where refusal to supply offends principles of fairness, and is
therefore prohibited, is refusing to supply an existing customer with a
necessary raw material when that customer is also a competitor in a downstream market, and the raw material is necessary to manufacture the
downstream product.270 Similarly, an unfair refusal to supply occurs when
“a powerful firm permit[s] rivals to compete and prosper ... and then
pull[s] the rug out.”271 Such a situation occurred in Aspen Skiing,272 where
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the dominant firm originally allowed its competitor (both firms operated
ski facilities in the same region) to engage in a joint marketing scheme and
a ticketing system where customers could buy passes that could be used at
either facility. However, when the competitor started prospering, the dominant firm cancelled the agreement.273 Like predatory pricing, these
instances of refusal to supply demonstrate when competition law takes
fairness into account—when conduct crosses a line and ceases to be rigorous competition and instead becomes abusive. This unfair behavior impinges upon the economic freedom of individuals by not giving that individual a reasonable opportunity to function in the marketplace. The
individual’s economic freedom is crushed by more powerful, or dominant,
actors. This crushing of individual economic freedom damages not only
the individual concerned, but also the relevant market, and society as a
whole.
The abuse of dominance is most clearly seen (from an economic freedom perspective) by the use of competition laws to protect democracy
itself. Judge Learned Hand called “great industrial consolidations ... inherently undesirable.”274 This is because great economic power, when linked
with “anti-competitive conduct ... is incompatible with democracy.”275 For
instance, following World War II, the United States introduced competition laws into Germany and Japan in order to “diffuse centers of power”
that might otherwise “be marshalled behind [resurgent] authoritarian regimes.”276 This comes from a general fear that freedom and democracy are
“put at risk when a few citizens and groups dominate a large share of resources.”277 An example of such economic power influencing political
decisions is found in modern-day Hong Kong, where business interests
have used their influence to ensure that the Hong Kong government opposes “domestic or international legislation on competition.”278 Wilkinson
and Pickett note that:
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[H]alf of the world’s largest economies are multinationals, and that
General Motors is bigger than Denmark, that DaimlerChrysler is bigger
than Poland; Royal Dutch/Shell bigger than Venezuela, and Sony bigger than Pakistan. Like the aristocratic ownership of huge tracts of land,
which in 1791 Tom Paine attacked in his The Rights of Man, these productive assets remain effectively in the hands of a very few, very rich
people, and make our claims to real democracy look pretty thin.279

It is clear that competition law can play a much wider role than mere
economic efficiency, particularly given the immense economic clout
wielded by multinational corporations. Competition law can be used to
safeguard our rights to engage in economic activity and our system of
government.
E. The Protection of Competitors
Using competition law to protect competitors fits in well with ordoliberal thought, as protecting competitors is arguably a method to prevent
dominant firms from wielding too much power and potentially limiting the
economic freedom of other actors. Motta states that the defense of small
firms is “one of the main reasons behind the adoption of competition
laws.”280 In line with an ordoliberal justification for the protection of competitors, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
[I]t is not for the real prosperity of any country that ... changes should
occur which result in transferring an independent business man, the
head of his establishment, small though it might be, into a mere servant
or agent of a corporation for selling the commodities which he once
manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in shaping the business policy of the company and bound to obey orders issued by others.281

The protection of competitors is also in keeping with the SCP framework.282 By protecting competitors, the structure of the market is protected, thus preventing a firm from achieving a dominant position. For
instance, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the role of U.S. antitrust law was the “protection of competition, not competitors.”283 However, in the Supreme Court’s opinion, the
279
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best way “to promote competition [is] through the protection of viable,
small, locally owned businesses.”284 Brown Shoe was one of many cases
during the 1960s in which the Warren Court protected small firms in order
to protect the competitive process.285 It is because of this that the argument
has been advanced that protecting competitors is the same as protecting
competition itself, as “an effort to protect competitors includes protecting
competition”286—after all, “competition requires competitors.”287 The ECJ
has also noted that it is sometimes difficult to separate the protection of
competitors “from the maintenance of an effective competitive structure.”288
In addition to protecting the structure of the market, other benefits that
potentially accrue from the protection of competitors are innovation and
promotion of local businesses.289 According to Motta: “The European
Commission seems to have taken the view that small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs) are more dynamic, more likely to innovate and more
likely to create employment than large firms. This would be an additional
argument to promote SMEs. However, the empirical evidence is quite
ambiguous.”290 The possibility of smaller competitors being more innovative is an economic efficiency goal, whereas the promotion of competitors
to protect local firms is a non-efficiency goal. There is a current of thought
that local businesses, being part of the local community, will be more
likely to serve broader goals, such as promoting a high level of employment.291 As Justice Douglas memorably stated in defense of localism:
“Control of American business is being transferred from local communities to distant cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets
and profit and loss statements before them decide the fate of communities
with which they have little or no relationship.”292 An example of the protection of local firms from the encroachment of larger national or multinational competitors is the French “zone de chalandise,” the purpose of
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which is “to guarantee that small butchers and bakers will not face ruinous
competition from large-square-footage stores.”293
Despite these potential benefits flowing from the protection of competitors, this aim faces considerable criticisms.294 Williams describes the
protection of competitors as a “political slogan” in defense of the “little
guy,” “but bad economics.”295 The main criticism of the protection of
competitors is that, as an aim, it is not economically efficient.296 Protecting
smaller firms leads to inefficient allocation of resources and undermines
the competitive process; by shielding smaller firms from their larger and
more successful rivals, large firms are denied their “economies of scale in
a market” which allow these large firms the ability to compete in the most
effective manner.297 A non-efficiency criticism of the protection of competitors is somewhat darker in its nature; essentially, that the protection of
small firms finds its roots in anti-Semitic opposition to Jewish owned
chain-stores in pre-World War II Europe.298 Despite the inevitable criticism that the protection of competitors is not economically efficient, arguments could be advanced that small, locally-owned businesses are as
important to a society’s well-being as vast multi-national conglomerates.
Given that smaller firms are likely to be more fragile than large competitors, there is an argument to be made that SMEs deserve a special measure
of protection.
F. Protecting the Environment through Competition Law
Despite not being economically efficient, the aims of economic freedom and the protection of competitors are established goals of competition
law regimes.299 Using competition law for environmental concerns is a
relatively new concept. Environmental concerns have been used by the
European Commission to permit conduct that would otherwise have been
considered anticompetitive.300 The Commission has not directly stated that
environmental concerns are enough to trump competition; the closest the
Commission has come to this is allowing an agreement on the basis that it
293
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“gives direct practical effect to environmental objectives.”301 However, the
Commission has primarily sought to justify the inclusion of environmental
concerns on the basis of “economic progress”302 or economic efficiency.303
Thus, the Commission is attempting to subsume environmental issues into
the consumer welfare standard. For instance, in the Philips-Osram decision, the Commission noted that a reduction in air pollution created “direct
and indirect benefits for consumers.”304
Integrating environmental concerns into the consumer welfare standard can be justified because “consumers do not properly take into account all the externalities involved in their purchase and consumption
decisions.”305 This stance was specifically taken by the Commission in
CECED.306 Essentially, the Commission has directly equated environmental concerns with economic efficiency.307 Monti describes this method of
analysis as “remarkable.”308 From a consumer welfare perspective, it is
hard to understand why consumer choice should be limited because of
environmental concerns; a purist of the Chicago School would not approve. Of course, from a total or social welfare perspective, the PhilipsOsram, CECED, and DSD decisions could be justified because, in the long
run, society as a whole reduces costs by preventing environmental damage
(rather than paying to repair it). However, this author would submit that
environmental protection is just another public policy, or non-efficiency,
aim for competition law. The Commission should seek to clarify its position, and state that it does consider non-efficiency aims, such as the environment, rather than dishonestly attempting to shoehorn these aims into
the consumer welfare standard.
G. Promoting Employment
Promoting a high level of employment is, like environmental protection, a public policy goal that contributes to the total welfare of society.
Given that “[c]ompetition ... is not an ultimate goal in itself, but rather an
instrument to enhance the welfare of people,”309 then arguably one of the
301
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most important roles for competition law should be promoting and sustaining a high level of employment. Without discussing the importance given
to employment (or the environment for that matter) under the TFEU,
which will be discussed below,310 there are compelling reasons for accepting the consideration of employment in competition law analysis. If competition law benefits the individual as a consumer, should it not also seek
to benefit the individual when he or she is functioning as a producer?
The Commission and the European courts have considered employment issues to be a valid part of competition law analysis, even if this is
not always clear.311 In Ford/Volkswagen the Commission noted that a joint
venture would create “about 5,000 jobs and indirectly create up to another
10,000 jobs.”312 However, the Commission then went on to state that this
was not “enough to make an exemption possible.”313 The Court of First
Instance confirmed that the Commission had only considered the employment benefits of the Ford and Volkswagen joint venture “supererogatorily,” and that “the operative part of the decision adopted would have
been exactly the same” regardless of the jobs created.314 Both European
institutions insist that job creation was purely incidental to the Commission’s decision.315 However, Monti states that “many are persuaded that
the agreement’s impact on employment was a relevant factor.”316 Arguably, it is strange to state in a Commission decision that an agreement will
lead to job creation, and then go on to state that such a benefit is irrelevant
to the analysis.
Although Ford/Volkswagen might arguably be the most opaque decision in terms of the incorporation of employment considerations into competition law, other European decisions have barely been clearer. For instance, in the Synthetic Fibres317 and Stichting Baksteen318 decisions, the
Commission noted that the parties to the agreement would “endeavour, as
far as possible, to secure the retraining and redeployment of any labour
310
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displaced in the process of restructuring.”319 These decisions suggest that,
“the agreements might not have been approved” without “measures designed to soften the blow on employment;” however, this is not forthrightly stated.320 In Metro-SB-Grossmärkte v. Commission, the ECJ held
that “the provision of employment” was one of the factors that “may” be
considered under Article 101(3),321 meaning that an agreement which is
considered anticompetitive under Article 101(1) may be exempted under
101(3) if it has a beneficial impact upon employment. The problem with
this holding is the use of the word “may.” “May” does not provide clear
guidance; it suggests only that it is a factor that might be used, meaning
that employment resides in a grey area being neither excluded nor required
for consideration. This sort of jurisprudence provides neither clarity nor
guidance. Of course, as this Article argues below, employment must now
be considered under the TFEU.322
The impact of firm conduct upon employment has only produced a limited impression in the United States; perhaps because “labor rights plays
a far more central role in Europe than in the United States.”323 The one
area where employment and labor laws meet with competition laws, and
“trump the competition law ones,” are collective agreements.324 The U.S.
Supreme Court,325 the ECJ,326 and the Chancery Division of the High
Court of England and Wales327 have all held that collective bargaining
arrangements are excluded from competition law. In all the cases cited,
much the same reasoning was given for excluding collective bargaining
from the remit of competition law, namely, that allowing competition law
to intrude into collective bargaining would significantly undermine labor
rights.328 On the basis of decisions like Ford/Volkswagen and the MetroSB-Grossmärkte judgment, it seems that employment considerations have
319

Synthetic Fibres, supra note 317, ¶ 18; see also Stichting Baksteen, supra note
318, ¶ 12.
320
MONTI, supra note 36, at 97.
321
Case 26/76, Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co KG v. Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R.
1875, ¶ 43.
322
See infra notes 323–29 and accompanying text.
323
Whitman, supra note 168, at 395.
324
TOWNLEY, supra note 83, at 60.
325
See Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 622 (1975).
326
See Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5863, ¶¶ 55–56.
327
See Reynolds v. Shipping Fed’n [1924] 1 Ch. 28, 39 (Eng.).
328
Connell Const. Co., Inc., 421 U.S. at 622; Albany Int’l, 1999 E.C.R. I-5863, ¶ 59;
see also Reynolds [1924] 1 Ch at 39.

2012]

COMPATIBLE OR CONFLICTING

101

only entered into competition law analysis at the European Union level,
making employment an almost unique consideration to the EU, although
Furse states that increasing employment was the original reason behind the
UK’s competition law.329 It is now time to move on from an almost unique
consideration of the EU, to the unique consideration of the EU, an aim that
has truly been the guiding light for EU competition law.
H. The Role of Competition Law in the Single Market Integration of the
European Union
Competition law has been described as “central to the integration
project,”330 as the European Union has “a fixation on the creation of a
single EU-wide market.”331 Given the structure of the various treaties, it
was arguably inevitable that competition law would be imbued with this
unique mandate.332 As such, in market integration, EU competition law
has a goal that takes “priority over economic efficiency.”333
However, Odudu argues that single market integration is an efficiency
goal:
A driver for market integration is the realization that firms in isolated
markets, which concentrate solely on satisfying the demand of their
home market, cannot exploit efficiency advantages because the minimum efficient scale may greatly exceed national demand. In a larger,
integrated market, firms have the ability and incentive to specialize,
improve their technical efficiency, and exploit economies of scale and
other cost advantages.334

This is perhaps true, but if so it is an unintended consequence of the
single market integration goal, rather than the underlying reason for market integration. Albors-Llorens better explains why the EU has relied on
competition law to integrate the single market:
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The EC Treaty provisions on free movement of goods, persons and services are primarily concerned with the removal of barriers that Member
States might put in place to compartmentalise the territory of the Common Market along national lines. The removal of these barriers, however, does not suffice to achieve a unified market. In particular, private
parties could carry out anti-competitive practices and Member States
could give artificial competitive advantages to ailing national industries
or prevent the liberalisation of markets traditionally subject to state
monopolies. All these activities could effectively divide the Common
Market. A system ensuring undistorted competition is, therefore, an essential piece in the single market jigsaw.335

Albors-Llorens’s explanation that competition law was used to promote and protect market integration is amply demonstrated by case law
and Commission decisions.336 Consten and Grundig v. Commission337 and
Italy v. Council launched the relevant line of case law.338 These cases were
decided on the same day in 1966, and in almost identical language ruled
that private firms could not “recreate”339 or “restore”340 the barriers between Member States that the European Union (in its previous incarnations) had sought to abolish. A long line of case law confirms the importance of market integration in competition law,341 as do Commission
Decisions342 and Commission Guidelines.343 As such, the primary significance of market integration in EU competition law cannot be disputed,
let alone ignored. There could be an argument for stating that the relatively recent case of Bayer AG344 demonstrates that the ECJ is no longer inter335
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ested in using competition law to pursue the market integration goal. After
all, the ECJ affirmed the CFI’s judgment in Bayer AG v. Commission.345
In its judgment, the CFI stated: “[I]t is not open to the Commission to
attempt to achieve a result, such as the harmonisation of prices in the medicinal products market.”346 This statement by the CFI has been taken as
evidence of:
[The CFI’s] hostility to the Commission’s attempt of forcing price
harmonisation by using competition law. ... [T]he CFI’s pronouncements under Art[icle 101] ... serve as a warning to the Commission
against its policy of using competition law as a vehicle for bringing
about forced market integration. Whilst the goal of market integration
has always been an underlying imperative of [EU] competition law, it
seems that this goal is no longer to be blindly pursued at the expense of
all other interests.347

Although Dawes’ interpretation of the CFI’s judgment in Bayer AG v.
Commission might be correct, to apply the same interpretation to the
ECJ’s judgment in Bayer would be to misread the judgment. The ECJ did
not hold that market integration was no longer an objective of competition
law, but rather that there had been no violation of competition law because
an agreement could not be proved (therefore Article 101 did not apply),348
and, as Bayer was not in a dominant position, Article 102 did not apply.349
As such, there is no logical reading of Bayer that would suggest that the
ECJ no longer considers market integration a goal of competition law. The
aim of single market integration highlights the fact that EU competition
law operates in a unique environment, distinct from any other in the world.
That being the case, it is now necessary to consider the framework of EU
law, of which Article 101 is just a part.
IV. COMPETITION LAW WITHIN AN EU FRAMEWORK
The European Union has been described as “a radical experiment in
the creation of open markets”350 and “represents the most advanced form
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of regional social and economic integration”351 on the planet. Therefore,
the EU can justifiably be described as unique. Such a unique organization
perhaps requires a unique competition regime; after all, the European
Union’s “structural features are markedly different from the unified single
market of the United States.”352 As such, in order to understand what function and role competition law in general, and Article 101 in particular,
should play means “putting Article [101] in its [Union] context.”353 In
order to explain the purpose of competition law within an EU framework,
the following will be discussed: (1) the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, with particular regard to policy-linking clauses; (2) the
dispute between the courts and the European Commission over the role of
Article 101; and (3) the political dimension of European Commission
decision-making.
A. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) superseded the Treaty establishing the European Community.354 The TFEU
came into effect on the 1st December 2009, which was the date the Lisbon
Treaty entered into force, following the ratification of the treaty by Ireland
and the Czech Republic, the last two Member States to do so.355 This was
in accordance with Article 6(2) of the Lisbon Treaty.356 The TFEU is to be
read in conjunction with the Treaty on European Union (TEU); both treaties “have the same legal value.”357 The TEU lays out “the mission and
values of the European Union,”358 whereas the TFEU is more of a functional document (as the name suggests). From a competition perspective
this is significant because the TEU makes no mention of “competition.”359
Among the aims of the EU listed in the TEU is that the Union “shall work
351
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for the sustainable development of Europe ... aiming at full employment,”360 meaning that promoting a high level of employment is an aim of
the EU whereas competition is not. Competition is of course mentioned in
the TFEU, but, as is argued below, it does appear that competition has
been downgraded following Lisbon.361
Before moving on to the impact of Lisbon, it is necessary to consider
the structure of the TFEU and the impact this has upon the aims of competition law. Unlike the United States’ Sherman Act, EU competition law is
not “stand-alone competition legislation aimed at isolated goals, but ... part
of a web of inter-related Treaty articles.”362 This creates the problem of
whether the articles of the TFEU relating to competition, Article 101 and
Article 102, should be read “in isolation” or in conjunction with the TFEU
as a whole.363 Those who believe in the sole consumer welfare goal for EU
competition law must argue that Article 101 should be read in isolation
from the rest of the Treaty because the TFEU insists on the inclusion of
multiple goals.
The TFEU creates multiple goals, and the potential for conflict between these goals comes “through the hierarchy of its articles and due to
the presence of policy-linking clauses.”364 What Townley means by a
hierarchy of articles in the Treaties is that not all articles are created equal.
The top-level aims of the European Union (including the promotion of a
high level of employment) can be found in Article 3 TEU.365 The requirement to promote a high level of employment can also be found in Article 9
TFEU.366 Another Article that would appear to encourage employment to
be considered under competition is Article 173(1) TFEU.367 Article 173(1)
deals with industrial policy and states that “cooperation between undertakings” is to be encouraged, as is “speeding up the adjustment of industry to
structural changes.”368 Although Article 173(3) goes on to state that the
Title should not distort competition, it is arguable that 173(1) can be relied
upon as a basis for exempting an agreement which might otherwise breach
Article 101(3).
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Article 173 is a good example of the inherent contradiction within
areas of EU policy. Townley points out that, “[t]reaty provisions incorporate conflicting values.”369 Within Article 173 there is a contradiction
between 173(1) and 173(3). Article 173(1) calls for a system of “competitiveness” that “encourag[es] an environment favourable to cooperation
between undertakings.”370 But 173(3) states that the Article cannot be
relied upon to create a “distortion of competition.”371 Article 173(3), it
should be noted, is also an integration clause: “The Union shall contribute
to the achievement of the objectives set out in paragraph 1 through the
policies and activities it pursues under other provisions of the Treaties.”372
Article 173 is arguably a good example of the bizarre way that the EU
Treaties deal with conflicting policy goals: giving with one hand and taking away with the other. However, perhaps Article 173 is more useful than
it might at first appear. The Article states that the EU’s system of competition should take into account industrial policy and allow a system of competition which permits undertakings to cooperate.373 However, such cooperation is only to the extent necessary to allow Union industrial policies to
be achieved, but cartel-like collusion that damages “competition” will be
prohibited.374 Whether this Article’s interpretation of Article 173 is in fact
correct will be determined by the European Courts; however, such an
interpretation would seem to appropriately balance industrial policy
against the potential negative impact on other EU goals.
These potentially diverse and conflicting EU aims must be considered
when applying any other article in either the TEU or the TFEU because of
policy-linking clauses. These policy-linking clauses, or integration clauses, require that the overriding objectives of the EU are taken into account
by the relevant EU institution whenever a decision is made. The overriding objectives of the EU are found in Article 3 of the TEU and are listed in
more detail in Title II of Part One of the TFEU.375 The first article in Title
II, Article 7, has been described as the “super-integration clause”376 and
states: “The Union shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the
369
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principle of conferral of powers.”377 Article 7 and the remainder of Title II
can be seen as the “tool[s] for the achievement of ... Treaty objective[s].”378 What this means is that the integration clauses, as tools to accomplish EU objectives, bind together disparate and seemingly unconnected areas of law and policy and ensure that, as a body, they are pointing
towards a common goal. Therefore, when considering the application of
Article 101 it is necessary for the Union’s institutions to “take into account
requirements linked to the promotion of a high level of employment.”379
Relying on Article 9 to integrate employment concerns into Article 101 is
perhaps particularly pertinent at the present moment. As the Commission
stated: “[T]he top challenge for the EU today must be to prevent high
levels of unemployment, to boost job creation and to pave the way for
economic renewal, sustainable recovery and growth. This will only be
achieved with stronger cooperation between all stakeholders [and] better
policy coordination.”380 By making statements concerning the promotion
of employment and policy coordination, this Article suggests that the
Commission implicitly recognizes that a concerted effort is called for, and
such a concerted effort is precisely why the Treaties include integration
clauses.
It should be noted that Article 7 was introduced by the Lisbon amendments, but it is not revolutionary. Article 7 can be seen as a codification
and development of ECJ case law.381 However, what is not clear is the
legal status of integration clauses. As Schumacher asks, are “integration
clause[s] merely a political principle or do [they] have legal force?”382
This author would argue that, given the ECJ’s teleological approach to
interpreting the Treaties, the integration clauses are not merely policy
statements but have legal effect.383
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As such, it seems clear that owing to the policy-linking clauses, Article
101 “should generally be read so as to incorporate other objectives.”384
However, this is not a universally accepted view: Odudu seeks to argue
that policy-linking clauses should not be applied to the competition provisions of the TFEU.385 Odudu’s argument is based on the fact that, as the
policy-linking clauses create “a positive legal obligation,” it should be
expected that the clauses would “be expressly invoked in the jurisprudence
of the Court as justifying consideration of non-efficiency objectives.”386
Odudu goes on to note that, in relation to competition law, the ECJ has
singularly failed to do so.387 However, Monti disagrees with Odudu’s
assessment, and writes: “[T]he European Court of Justice has regularly
held that the competition rules must be read in the context of the wider
ambitions of the [Union].”388 The following passages from ECJ judgments
support Monti’s statement: “[R]estrictions on competition, that are permitted by the Treaty in certain circumstances because the various aims of the
Treaty must be reconciled with one another,”389 and “the aims of the
common agricultural policy, whose precedence over the application of the
Treaty provisions relating to competition is enshrined in the Treaty itself.”390
Of course, there is an argument to be made that both Odudu and Monti
are correct, in that “non-efficiency objectives” and “the wider ambitions of
the Union” are not necessarily one and the same.391 This author would
seek to dispute that statement because the aims of the EU listed in Article
3 TEU would not be considered efficiency goals by those who advocate a
consumer welfare/economic efficiency approach to competition law.
Therefore, although the wording is different, it is submitted that “nonefficiency objectives” and “the wider ambitions of the Union” can be
considered analogous.
As such, it seems clear that the EU competition policy must consider
more than just consumer welfare, and that the ECJ has recognized that the
structure of the EU’s treaties demands the consideration of goals other
than economic efficiency; in short, “competition policy cannot be imple384
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mented in a vacuum, but must be consistent with the development of the
European project.”392 Essentially, within the EU, “competition policy is
subservient to other policy objectives.”393 Part of the beauty of the EU
treaties is that, although they list the aims of the European Union, these
aims are not ranked at the highest level (despite the hierarchy of articles);
this is important as it allows the European Union to achieve the “optimal
balance”394 as priorities shift over time. Gerber is arguably wrong to express concern over the reduced rule for single market integration; Gerber
states that, with the EU having almost achieved the goal of a single market, competition law “faces fundamental questions about what it is doing
and why.”395
So although Gerber is correct in writing: “The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 began a process of integration in
which competition law has played a pivotal role, and that process has, in
turn, imbued competition law with roles and influence far beyond those it
is likely to have achieved otherwise,”396 that does not mean that single
integration is, or has to be, the sole goal of European competition law. The
structure of the TFEU allows aims to change over time to achieve what is
necessary.397 Now that single market integration is near to completion, that
does not mean that EU competition law is adrift without its “lodestar;”398
rather, it means that the EU can now give priority to other objectives.
What this Article seeks to argue is that the EU, particularly given the current global economic climate, should now focus on employment issues.
This is in order to protect European workers who are potentially under
threat of losing their jobs as employers seek to lower costs by “relocat[ing]
production to lower-cost regions.”399
However, prior to Lisbon, the suggestion was made that, “[o]nce the
internal market aims are fully achieved, EC competition law might become more independent from the other Treaty provisions and therefore
less based on principles and more focused on economic analysis.”400 Monti suggested that the Commission should either “clarify” or “eliminate” the
392
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role of non-efficiency goals under Article 101.401 With the ratification of
Lisbon, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, non-efficiency goals will
continue to be considered in the EU’s competition laws and the Commission will have no choice but to continue to consider such goals.
The most dramatic impact that Lisbon has had on competition law is
that Article 3(1)(g) EC has no equivalent in the TFEU. Article 3(1)(g) EC
stated: “[T]he activities of the Community shall include ... a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted.”402 However,
Lavrijssen has dismissed the impact of the removal of Article 3(1)(g) EC
on the importance of competition law as a Union aim.403 Lavrijssen writes
that: “[C]ompetition policy is explicitly mentioned as a Union competence
in art. 3(1)(b) TFEU. The latter provision has taken over the function of
art. 3(1)(g) EC.”404 Therefore, Lavrijssen’s argument is that competition
has not been downgraded as an EU policy. This argument is less than
convincing. Article 3(1)(b) TFEU states: “The Union shall have exclusive
competence in the following areas: ... the establishing of the competition
rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market.”405 The language used in Article 3(1)(b) suggests a downgrading of competition, in
that competition is now only necessary as far as it is “necessary for the
functioning of the internal market.”406 It could be suggested that this is a
very different, and far more limited, goal than the Article 3(1)(g) EC goal
of ensuring that competition is not distorted.
Essentially, under the TFEU, competition has been downgraded because it is not an aim in itself, but is instead subservient to the “functioning” of the European Union.407 According to Graupner, the Commission
has dismissed this revision of language, which has downgraded competition as “a storm in a teacup.”408 However, given that the European Courts
“have periodically found it necessary to refer to the [EU]’s objectives
specifically,”409 it is clearly possible that a change in language could well
have an impact upon the role of competition in the EU. For instance, in
401
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Eco Swiss China Time, the ECJ felt it necessary to refer to Article 3(1)(g)
EC as underpinning what is now Article 101.410 Continental Can went
further and described Article 3(1)(g) as “so essential that without it numerous provisions on the treaty would be pointless.”411
It is important to note that another reference to competition as a Union
aim is found in Protocol (No. 27), which states: “[T]he internal market as
set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes a system
ensuring that competition is not distorted.”412 This wording is similar to
that of Article 3(1)(g) EC; however, the fact that this wording has been
removed from the Treaty itself and placed in a Protocol is indicative of the
downgrading of competition as a Union aim, and once again reinforces the
fact that the Union Courts are likely to give less weight to competition in
the future when competition is balanced against Union aims that feature in
Title I, TEU and Title II, TFEU.
In a recent judgment, the ECJ referred to Protocol (No. 27) as an
“integral part of the Treaties,”413 which indicates that the Union Courts
will continue to have regard for the principle that competition should not
be distorted. This has been taken as evidence that competition has not
been downgraded as a Union aim.414 Arguably, this reads too much into
the judgment. In the case before the ECJ, there was no opposing policy
aim which competition needed to be balanced against. Accordingly, competition could be given free rein; the real test to determine the importance
of competition in the post-Lisbon Union will come when competition must
be weighed against the aims laid out in Title I, TEU and Title II, TFEU.
The other impact of the Lisbon amendments was the expanded role for
policy-linking clauses.415 Most notable was the inclusion of Article 7
TFEU,416 “which demands consistency between the Community policies
410
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and activities, taking all of the objectives into account.”417 As such, Lisbon
insists upon the recognition of non-efficiency goals in EU competition
policy.418
B. The Dispute between the Courts and the European Commission over
the Role of Article 101
Within the European Union, enforcement of competition law is the responsibility of the European Commission, specifically the Directorate
General for Competition, whereas the responsibility for determining the
ambit of European law falls to the Court of Justice of the European Union.419 As such, there is the possibility that the Commission and court will
clash over the role and function of competition law. This situation is hardly unique. For example, in the United States, the Department of Justice’s
Antitrust Division enforces federal antitrust law, and the federal courts
rule on challenges to the legality of the Department of Justice’s actions.420
Essentially, it is not uncommon to divide responsibilities for competition
law between an administrative agency charged with enforcement and
judicial oversight being provided by the relevant courts.
The Commission and courts have come into conflict because the
Commission has tried to establish a sole consumer goal for competition
law, which is free of political (that is, non-efficiency) considerations.421
However, the courts have adopted a teleological approach to interpreting
treaty articles.422 Teleological interpretation, or construction, is “[a]n interpretation that looks to the ‘evil’ that the statute is trying to correct (i.e.,
the statute’s purpose).”423 Due to this teleological approach, “[t]he ECJ
gives the interpretation most likely to further what it considers that provision in its context was aimed to achieve. Often this is very far from a literal interpretation of the Treaty and may even fly in the face of the express
language.”424 Examples of the courts using a teleological approach can be
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found in Commission v. Belgium,425 and R. (on the application of University of Cambridge) v. HM Treasury.426 In the specific context of mergers,
the ECJ held that an EU Regulation must be interpreted “by reference to
its purpose and general structure.”427 As a general proposition, part of the
reason behind the adoption of the teleological approach can be found in
the different legal cultures of the Member States. Because of differences in
language and legal culture between the Member States, “the scope of the
provision at issue cannot be appraised solely on the basis of a textual interpretation. Its meaning must therefore be clarified in the light of ... its
place in the system of Community law ... and its purpose.”428
This teleological approach clearly has the potential to clash with the
Commission’s consumer welfare approach, particularly because under
Article 267(a) TFEU the Court of Justice of the European Union has ultimate authority to determine “the interpretation of the Treaties.”429 Using
their authority and the teleological approach, the courts have incorporated
non-efficiency goals into Article 101 and balanced competition against
other Union objectives.430 However, before Lisbon, the Commission’s
consumer welfare view seemed to be in the ascendant. Monti commented
that, “the future relevance of non-economic public policy considerations is
bleak.”431 Prior to Lisbon, the Commission published documents stating
that the sole goal of competition law is consumer welfare.432 Academics
supported the Commission and argued that Article 101 “should be liberated” from non-efficiency goals.433 Furthermore, in GlaxoSmithKline
Services v. Commission the Court of First Instance held that “the objective
assigned to Art. [101(1) TFEU] ... is to prevent undertakings, by restricting competition between themselves or with third parties, from reducing
the welfare of the final consumer of the products.”434 The CFI’s GlaxoSmithKline judgment finally gave the Commission’s consumer welfare goal
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an air of legitimacy.435 As Townley noted, there had previously been no
basis for the Commission’s position:
The Commission has not sought to justify its adoption of a unitary objective on theoretical grounds. Its guidelines claim that they outline the
current state of the case law. However, there is general consensus that
public policy goals have been considered within Article [101] EC; and
the Community Courts’ (European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Court of
First Instance (CFI)) judgments continue to do so today (as do many of
the Commission’s own Article [101](3) decisions).436

However, this sole consumer welfare goal of Article 101 was not accepted by the ECJ,437 which leaves the Commission without any legitimacy for its consumer welfare claims. The strengthening of policy-linking
clauses and the removal of Article 3(1)(g) EC from the TFEU also further
undermine the Commission’s ambitions for a sole consumer welfare goal.
It is therefore arguably clear that Lisbon tilted the direction of competition
law back towards the multiple goals of competition law favored by teleological interpretation. It is equally clear that, in spite of what Evans believes, the courts do not give “the Commission a great deal of deference.”438
C. The Political Dimension of European Commission Decision-Making
It therefore seems that the European Commission’s efforts to get consumer welfare recognized as the sole goal of Article 101 are faltering, if
not entirely failed. However, there is another issue that complicates Commission decision-making; although the Directorate General for Competition investigates firm conduct to determine whether it violates Article 101,
the ultimate decision as to whether to permit or prohibit conduct under
Article 101 falls to the twenty-seven European Commissioners.439 The
College of Commissioners vote collectively on whether to adopt a decision,440 and any discussions relating to a Commission decision “shall be
confidential.”441 This means the actual reasoning of the Commissioners
435
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remains hidden, as the Commissioners may well adopt “compromise solutions which the text of the decision may fail to reflect.”442
Monti points to the de Havilland443 decision to highlight how political
considerations come into play when decisions are put before the College
of Commissioners, and the impact of personalities upon decisionmaking.444 Monti explains that the de Havilland merger was prohibited
because the then Commissioner for Competition, Leon Brittan, was a
consumer welfare advocate, whereas other Commissioners wanted to
approve the merger because of the beneficial non-efficiency effects.445
From Monti’s discussion of the decision to prohibit the de Havilland
merger, it seems obvious that personalities play a part in the enforcement
of EU competition law. As such, it is relevant to consider the personality
and politics of the Commissioner for Competition. In February 2010, Joaquín Almunia replaced Neelie Kroes as the Commissioner for Competition.446 Neelie Kroes, who frequently made statements in support of the
sole consumer welfare aim during her tenure as Competition Commissioner,447 is a member of the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy448 which has a conservative-liberal ideology.449 This places Kroes on
the center-right of the political spectrum, in contrast to her successor,
Almunia, who is a member of, and former prime ministerial candidate for,
the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers Party).450 As the name suggests, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party has a
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center-left or social-democratic ideology.451 Given the change in personnel
at the Commissioner level, it could be submitted that Almunia may prove
to be more receptive to non-efficiency concerns, such as employment, than
Kroes. Nevertheless, Kroes remains a Commissioner (now for Digital
Agenda and as a Vice President of the Commission452) and a formal
Commission decision is reached collectively by the College of Commissioners.453 As such, there is an argument to be made that Almunia becoming Competition Commissioner will not impact the Commission’s decisions, as Kroes will still be in a position to influence other Commissioners.
Accordingly, the argument would run that Almunia’s appointment will not
result in a change in the enforcement priorities or aims of EU competition
law. However, it is possible that Almunia’s influence could result in the
Directorate-General for Competition accounting for a broader range of
competition goals during their investigations, which would, in turn,
present the College with different choices than they would have had when
the Competition Commissioner was a consumer welfare purist.
V. BALANCING EMPLOYMENT AND CONSUMER WELFARE UNDER
ARTICLE 101—RULE OF REASON OR LEGAL EXCEPTION ANALYSIS?
Now that it has been clarified that consumer welfare should be balanced against other aims as a general principle, and that this is particularly true in the European Union—because of the policy-linking clauses—it
needs to be determined where exactly this balancing should take place.
Article 101 has a bifurcated structure, meaning that such a balancing test
could take place under either Article 101(1), (3), or both.454 A conservative interpretation of Article 101 is that Article 101(1) covers the prohibited activity, and the possibility that such activity can be excepted is dealt
with in (3). In order to consider whether this conservative interpretation is
correct, this Article will examine: the “rule of reason”455 approach, whereby a balancing test is conducted within Article 101(1)—the traditional
approach of prohibiting under (1) and exempting under (3)—and a balancing approach, which incorporates consideration of pro- and anticompeti451
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tive effects under both Article 101(1) and (3). First, rule of reason analysis
will be considered, then legal exception analysis, and finally, a bifurcated
balancing approach will be examined.
A. Rule of Reason Analysis under Article 101(1)
Adopting a rule of reason approach for balancing is not without controversy. As Callery states: “The existence of a ‘rule of reason’ in EU law
has been perhaps the most disputed issue in European legal circles.”456 In
this section, the following will be discussed: the origins of the rule of
reason in U.S. antitrust law; the debate over the existence of a European
rule of reason; and the ancillary restraints doctrine.
Before considering the origins of the rule of reason, it is necessary to
understand what “rule of reason” means. Rule of reason analysis, at least
as the term is understood in U.S. antitrust law, is a “freewheeling inquiry”457 which allows the courts to consider all the circumstances of an
agreement in order to determine if the overall effect of the agreement is
procompetitive or anticompetitive. The U.S. Supreme Court has explained
the rule of reason as being where “the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”458 The rule of
reason, therefore, allows a case-by-case analysis of the conduct in question
without having to adhere to a strict set of pre-determined rules, which by
their nature automatically declare conduct permissible or prohibited without further inquiry (such rules are referred to as “per se” rules459).
The rule of reason is generally considered to have arisen in the United
States.460 This is because if Section 1 of the Sherman Act is read literally,
then any and all agreements in restraint of trade would have been declared
illegal.461 The U.S. Supreme Court initially took this approach in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association.462 Such an approach clearly
has the potential to be wildly over-inclusive. An embryonic rule of reason
was first espoused in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
where it was held that the purpose of the Sherman Act “was to prevent
456
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undue restraints” of trade.463 The classic explanation of the rule of reason
was given by Justice Brandeis:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable.464

The rule of reason has since advanced and solidified as the cornerstone
of analysis in U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court has again and again
held that the rule of reason analysis should be employed to determine
whether an agreement is anticompetitive,465 whereas the importance of
inflexible per se rules has declined.466
However, Minda suggests that the perceived wisdom that the rule of
reason is an American concept is wrong. Minda points to a nineteenth
century House of Lords decision as the original rule of reason analysis in
competition law.467 In Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., Lord Macnaghten held that:
[R]estraints of trade and interference with individual liberty of action
may be justified by the special circumstances of a particular case. It is a
sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restriction is reasonable—reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests
of the parties concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of
the public, so framed and so guarded as to afford adequate protection to
the party in whose favour it is imposed, while at the same time it is in
no way injurious to the public.468
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This is clearly an articulation of the rule of reason. Given that Nordenfelt was decided seventeen years before Standard Oil, it can be submitted
that it is entirely possible that Nordenfelt influenced the Supreme Court’s
thinking on the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as Minda
suggests.469 In United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did acknowledge the importance of Nordenfelt when
determining whether a restraint of trade should be declared illegal.470 Regardless of the fact that the rule of reason may have originated on a different side of the Atlantic than is ordinarily supposed, it is clear that the rule
of reason constitutes a balancing test: a determination of whether the benefits of the agreement outweigh the anticompetitive parts of the agreement.
What is still not entirely clear though is whether a rule of reason exists in
European competition law. It should also be noted that the U.S.-style rule
of reason goes hand in hand with economic efficiency and consumer welfare, because it only examines “the economic consequences of a challenged agreement.”471 This raises the question of whether such a purely
economic efficiency test has a place in European competition law.
There are two aspects to the debate over a rule of reason in EU competition law. First, determining if such a rule of reason actually exists;
second, the benefits—or otherwise—of incorporating a rule of reason into
Article 101(1). These two aspects will be examined in turn.
When it comes to determining the existence of a rule of reason, the
case law is hardly a model of clarity; it is arguable that the case law points
in two contradictory directions. In spite of this, this Article will seek to
demonstrate that the jurisprudence has incorporated something like a rule
of reason into Article 101(1). Accordingly, it is accurate to state that “the
rule of reason has not yet crystallized as a valid standard by which to analyze agreements in the European Union.”472 However, it is not accurate for
Reindl to state that the European courts have wholeheartedly rejected the
American rule of reason approach and “are settled on this issue.”473 This is
because, while there is a rule of reason, or something resembling it, existing in European competition law, its scope is vaguely defined. As such, it
469

See Minda, supra note 467, at 519–20.
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d
as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
471
POSNER, supra note 87, at 38.
472
Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insights From U.S. Antitrust Law on Exclusive and
Restricted Territorial Distribution: The Creation of a New Legal Standard for European
Union Competition Law, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 559, 625 (1995).
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Andreas P. Reindl, Resale Price Maintenance and Article 101: Developing a More
Sensible Analytical Approach, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1300, 1314 (2010).
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is ambitious to state that the European rule of reason is categorically not
capable of being an economic efficiency test along the lines of the U.S.
rule of reason. Although this Article would submit that the EU should not
adopt the U.S. rule of reason, it is simply wrong to suggest that this area of
law is settled.
The first case in which the ECJ was asked to consider the existence of
a rule of reason was Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm
GmbH, where the Court called for a wide-ranging analysis of the pro- and
anticompetitive effects of the agreement in question.474 The balancing test
called for in Société Technique Minière can clearly be seen as a form of
rule of reason analysis.475 However, only a fortnight later in Consten &
Grundig, the ECJ held that there would be no rule of reason analysis,
“once it appears that [an agreement] has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.”476 As such, in the course of two
weeks in the summer of 1966, the ECJ laid the grounds for the confusion
regarding the possibility of rule of reason analysis under Article 101(1),
which has now persisted for over fifty years. However, Nazzini argues that
the two cases can be reconciled on the basis that Consten & Grundig “is
confined to agreements having the object of partitioning the common
market” (that is, partitioning of the single market is essentially per se prohibited) and Société Technique Minière “is of general application.”477 This
means that the courts should apply a balancing test unless the intention of
the agreement undermines the EU’s single-market aim.
In two later decisions of the ECJ, Metro SB-Grossmärkte478 and L.C.
Nungesser KG v. Commission of the European Communities,479 the Court
weighed the negative effects of the agreements in question against their
benefits.480 The ECJ conducted this analysis under Article 101(1) and

474

See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966
E.C.R. 235, 250.
475
See id. at 249–50 (noting “the need to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the economic context in which it is to be applied” and that “[t]he competition in
question must be understood within the actual context in which it would occur in the
absence of the agreement in dispute”).
476
Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 342.
477
Renato Nazzini, Article 81 EC Between Time Present and Time Past: A Normative
Critique of “Restriction of Competition” in EU Law, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 497, 510
(2006).
478
Case 26/76, Metro SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm’n, 1977 E.C.R.
1875.
479
Case 258/78, L.C. Nungesser KG v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015.
480
See id. ¶ 33; Metro SB- Grossmärkte GmbH, E.C.R. 1875 ¶ 21.
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concluded that the agreements were not “prohibit[ed]”481 or “incompatible”482 with 101(1). This developing rule of reason analysis has been described by Verouden as the European courts looking “beyond the negative
elements of agreements in their analysis under Article [101(1)] in order to
determine the actual economic impact on the market.”483 This rule of reason approach was clarified in European Night Services v. Commission of
the European Communities, where it was held that, “in assessing an
agreement under Article [101(1)] of the Treaty, account should be taken of
the actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the economic
context in which the undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the agreement and the actual structure of the market concerned.”484
Based on the case law examined so far, it would appear that the jurisprudence of the European courts was developing a rule of reason. In
1999, the ECJ took balancing further still by balancing the promotion of a
high level of employment against competition, instead of simply weighing
pro- and anticompetitive effects within Article 101(1).485 In Albany International v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, the ECJ considered the anticompetitive effects of collective bargaining, and held that
such agreements fell “outside the scope of Article [101(1)] of the Treaty.”486 Although Albany International dealt with an area of law that has
historically been excluded from the remit of competition law—collective
bargaining—the case does provide a limited foundation for arguing that
agreements which have a positive impact on employment levels should not
be prohibited under Article 101(1).487
However, despite the establishment of a rule of reason analysis by the
late twentieth-century, the concept was to come under assault by the Court
of First Instance in the twenty-first. In Métropole Télévision v. Commis481

See Metro SB-Grossmärkte GmbH, 1977 E.C.R. 1875 ¶¶ 20–21.
See L.C. Nungesser KG, 1982 E.C.R. 2015 ¶ 58.
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Verouden, supra note 455, at 553.
484
Joined Cases T-374, T-375, T-384 & T-388/94, Eur. Night Servs. v. Comm’n,
1998 E.C.R. II-3141, ¶ 136.
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See Case C-67/96, Albany Int’l BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. I-5751, ¶ 54.
486
Id. ¶ 60.
487
See id. ¶ 59 (“It is beyond question that certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations representing employers and workers.
However, the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously
undermined if management and labour were subject to Article [101(1)] of the Treaty
when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment.”).
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sion of the European Communities, the CFI stated that, “the existence of a
rule of reason in [Union] competition law is doubtful.”488 The reasoning of
the CFI was largely based on the use of the word “even” by the ECJ in
Montecatini SpA v. Commission of the European Communities: “[E]ven if
the rule of reason did have a place in the context of Article [101(1)] of the
Treaty.”489 In Montecatini, the ECJ essentially stated that a rule of reason
analysis was not necessary because the challenged agreement was so
clearly anticompetitive.490 Given that the proceedings in Montecatini did
not involve rule of reason analysis, the doubt cast by the use of “even” in
this judgment is arguably relatively minimal.491 This is especially apparent
when such doubt is balanced against the clear statements of the requirement of a balancing test in Metro SB-Grossmärkte and European Night
Services.492
Six months later, the ECJ held: “For the purposes of application of that
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the
overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings
was taken or produces its effects.”493 This is a restatement of the rule of
reason, or balancing, test. However, the ECJ went further still. Wouters
built on Albany International by holding that public policy arguments
could be used to “trump” competition, thus meaning that any such activities or agreements that promoted public-policy would not infringe Article
101(1).494 Monti has described the approach used in Wouters as the “European-style rule of reason.”495 This European-style rule of reason allows
anticompetitive effects to be balanced both against the procompetitive
effects of the agreement and “social and political concerns.”496 Due to this
recognition of a form of rule of reason analysis, “[i]t should now be recognized that Wouters has implicitly overruled Métropole.”497
In spite of Wouters, the CFI hardened its stance against the rule of reason. In Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission of the European Communities, the CFI stated that, “the Court would point out that the existence of
488

Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-2459, ¶ 72.
Case C-235/92 P, Montecatini SpA v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4539, ¶ 133.
490
Id. ¶ 132.
491
See id.
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See supra notes 478–84 and accompanying text.
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Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. I-1577, ¶ 97.
494
See id. ¶ 110.
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Monti, Public Policy, supra note 307, at 1088.
496
Callery, supra note 456, at 47 (arguing that Wouters goes beyond analysis of “pure
competition factors” and calls for “consideration of non-competition factors” as well).
497
Nazzini, supra note 477, at 535.
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such a rule in Community competition law is not accepted.”498 In O2
(Germany) GmbH & Co. OHG v. Commission of the European Communities, the CFI stated that recognition of a rule of reason under Article
101(1) would be “in contradiction to the case-law.”499 The CFI’s continued insistence that there is no rule of reason is somewhat bizarre, but is
perhaps based on the fact that the cases that lay out a rule of reason do not
refer to the form of analysis adopted as a “rule of reason.”500 Despite not
calling the form of analysis a rule of reason, the approach used is clearly a
balancing test, which bears similarities to the freewheeling inquiry of U.S.
antitrust. What is particularly interesting is that in O2 Germany, the CFI
dismissed any suggestions regarding the existence of a rule of reason,
before laying out a counterfactual inquiry501 that seems very similar to the
balancing approach required by a rule of reason analysis.502 In MecaMedina v. Commission of the European Communities, the ECJ once again
reiterated that a balancing test should be conducted under Article 101(1):

498

Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4653, ¶ 106.
Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmbH v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-1231, ¶ 65.
500
See supra notes 478–99 and accompanying text. The court commonly refers to a
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and “in which the undertakings operate.” O2 (Germany), E.C.R. II-1231 ¶ 66 (citing Case
22/71, Bèguelin Import v. S.A.G.L. Import Export, 1971 E.C.R. 949, ¶ 13); Case
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E.C.R. I-4515, ¶ 10); see also O2 (Germany), E.C.R. II-1231 ¶ 71 (“The examination
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Case C-234/89, Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG, 1991 E.C.R. I-935, ¶ 21; Case 56/65,
Société Technique Minière v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, 249–50).
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See Mel Marquis, O2 (Germany) v. Commission and the Exotic Mysteries of Article 81(1) EC, 32 EUR. L. REV. 29, 45 (2007) (“[T]he CFI seems to be applying the kind
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Not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the
parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid
down in [Article 101(1) TFEU]. For the purposes of application of that
provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the
overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings
was taken or produces its effects and, more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives
and are proportionate to them.503

This restatement that a balancing test can be conducted under Article
101(1) might serve to curb the CFI’s obsession with denying the existence
of such a test. It can therefore be submitted that Meca-Medina overrules
the denials of a rule of reason in Van den Bergh Foods and O2 Germany.
However, in Meca-Medina, the ECJ still did not specifically use the
phrase “rule of reason”—indeed the ECJ has used the terminology “rule of
reason” only in passing.504 This raises the question: what is the appropriate
terminology for the balancing test the ECJ is so clearly using?
Whish and Sufrin suggest that the phrase “rule of reason” should not
be used in European competition law, because “it invites misleading comparison with antitrust law analysis in the United States.”505 There is certainly truth in this criticism. The U.S. rule of reason is a balancing test
seeking to ensure that consumer welfare will ultimately be benefited by an
agreement.506 In contrast, the European-style rule of reason is more holistic, as the rule considers not only the pro- and anticompetitive effects of an
agreement, but also public policy considerations.507 Accordingly, the U.S.
rule of reason and the European-style rule of reason are, despite being
related, not identical twins. As such, there is certainly an advantage to the
503

Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-6991, ¶ 42 (citation
omitted).
504
See, e.g., Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R.
299, 342 (characterizing Grundig’s argument as seeking the application of a rule of
reason); Case C-235/92 P, Montecatini SpA v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. I-4539, ¶ 45 (discussing the CFI’s refusal to apply a rule of reason to the case); Case C-552/03 P, Unilever Bestfoods v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-9091, ¶ 13 (discussing the CFI’s rejection of
HB’s argument for application of a rule of reason).
505
Richard Whish & Brenda Sufrin, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 7 Y.B. EUR. L.
1, 37 (1987).
506
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (“In
its design and function the rule [of reason] distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that
are in the consumer’s best interest.”).
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See infra Part V.B.
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ECJ labeling the balancing test they have developed, as this would provide
clarity. It can be submitted that the ECJ should take the earliest opportunity to lay down the precise scope of the balancing test that has been developed, and then christen the test. Although this author would prefer terminology other than “rule of reason,” the phrase is not so inaccurate as to be
without meaning and will suffice until something more accurate comes
along.
Whish also argues against the very existence of a rule of reason, writing that “reasonable judgments” do not make a rule of reason.508 This
author would have to disagree with Professor Whish on this point. In all its
guises, the rule of reason is a balancing test. When a court reasonably
takes into account the pro- and anticompetitive effects of an agreement
and balances them against one another, then that court is conducting a rule
of reason analysis. Therefore, it is arguable that when the courts embark
on a counterfactual analysis,509 or balance pro- and anticompetitive effects
on the basis that the anticompetitive effects are merely “ancillary restraints,”510 the court is in fact carrying out a form of rule of reason analysis. Despite the ECJ’s reticence to adopt the phrase, the case law goes to
show that the rule of reason balancing test smells as sweet by any other
name.511
An argument against a rule of reason is that the rule, or any form of
balancing test, “imposes a great burden on the judiciary.”512 It is possible
to argue that removing a rule of reason-type balancing test from Article
101(1) would not reduce the burden; any such burden would simply be
shifted into Article 101(3). Therefore, removing a rule of reason-type
balancing test from Article 101(1) arguably might not streamline cases;
instead, parties would try to shoehorn their analysis into the exemptions
allowed by Article 101(3), despite the fact the exemptions listed may not
be appropriate.513 This Article submits that forcing the parties to balance
pro- and anticompetitive effects under inappropriate Article 101(3) exemptions may ultimately lead to confusion and increase the burden on the
judiciary.
508
509

WHISH, supra note 24, at 131.
See, e.g., Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmbH v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. II-1231,

¶ 71.
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See, e.g., Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-Klim Grovvareforening v. Dansk Landbrugs
Grovvareselskab AmbA, 1994 E.C.R. I-5641, ¶ 19.
511
See infra notes 522–34 and accompanying text.
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Whish & Sufrin, supra note 505, at 7.
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See TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(3). Article 101(3) is made up of four requirements that a restrictive agreement must meet in order to receive an exemption from the
provisions of Article 101(1). See infra notes 536–39 and accompanying text.
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The existence of Article 101(3) is the main objection to the existence
of a rule of reason-type analysis under Article 101(1). This is particularly
pertinent since the “Modernisation Regulation” came into force in 2004.514
The Modernisation Regulation gave the National Competition Authorities515 and the national courts516 power to exempt agreements under Article 101(3). Exempting, or excepting, under Article 101(3) had previously
been the exclusive reserve of the Commission.517 The purpose of the Modernisation Regulation was to “allow the Commission to increase its ability
to take on cases of [Union] interest and become more proactive. The result
is to multiply the number of agencies able to enforce [EU] competition
law, leading to more rigorous enforcement.”518 However, the risk arises
that with multiple agencies and countless courts in twenty-seven Member
States with the power to consider Article 101 in its entirety, there is a clear
temptation to bundle prohibition and exception into one rule of reason
analysis. For this reason, the Commission, wanting to ensure “consistency
in ... enforcement” despite this “era of decentralisation,” established the
European Competition Network (ECN).519 The aim of the ECN is to ensure that the Commission and the National Commission Authorities continue to use the same reasoning and form of analysis.520 Whether the promotion of a high level of employment may find a more suitable home
under Article 101(3) will be considered below,521 but before doing so, the
ancillary restraints doctrine will be discussed. The ancillary restraints
doctrine is a form of the rule of reason which has found favor, and been
named, by the European courts.522 However, it is submitted that it is perhaps not suitable for consideration of employment.
514
Council Regulation 1/2003, of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1,
25 (EC).
515
Id. at art. 5.
516
Id. at art. 6.
517
Council Regulation 17/62, of 21 February 1962, First Regulation Implementing
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 1962 O.J. (L 13) 204, art. 9(1) (EEC).
518
MONTI, supra note 36, at 404.
519
Firat Cengiz, Multi-Level Governance in Competition Policy: The European Competition Network, 35 EUR. L. REV. 660, 661 (2010).
520
See Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 43 (outlining how the ECN “provides a framework for the
cooperation of European competition authorities in cases where Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty are applied and is the basis for the creation and maintenance of a common competition culture in Europe”).
521
See infra Part V.B.
522
See, e.g., Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-2459,
¶ 104 (“In Community competition law the concept of an ‘ancillary restriction’ covers
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The ancillary restraints doctrine was first laid down, in the United
States, in Addyston Pipe by then-Judge Taft.523 An ancillary restraint is
where a restriction on competition is “merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the
enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract.”524 Essentially, the ancillary restraints doctrine allows that some restrictions on competition are
necessary in order to protect the procompetitive objective of the agreement. The ECJ has allowed such agreements, and therefore held that such
agreements were not prohibited by Article 101(1), which contained ancillary restraints such as: selective distribution systems,525 exclusive license
agreements,526 and joint buying cooperatives.527 On the basis of the case
law, it would seem that the ancillary restraints doctrine would not apply to
the promotion of a high level of employment, given that the ECJ has used
the doctrine to allow anticompetitive contractual terms in order to make
the overall agreement function properly.528 However, Faull and Nikpay
argue that the Commission decision of EPI Code of Conduct,529 and the
judgments in Wouters530 and Meca-Medina531 have created a “public interest objective” form of the ancillary restraints doctrine.532 It can be argued that the public interest ancillary restraints doctrine is no more than
another phrase for the European rule of reason. As such, the same murky
limits apply and, as Faull and Nikpay explain, “[t]he doctrine cannot
therefore be applied with certainty.”533
any restriction which is directly related and necessary to the implementation of a main
operation.”) (internal citations omitted). But see id. ¶ 107 (“[I]t must be observed that
inasmuch as ... the existence of a rule of reason in Community competition law cannot be
upheld, it would be wrong, when classifying ancillary restrictions ... to weigh the pro and
anti-competitive effects of an agreement.”).
523
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff’d as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
524
Id.
525
See Case 26/76, Metro SB-Grossmärkte GmbH & Co. KG v. Comm’n, 1977
E.C.R. 1875, ¶¶ 42–52.
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See Case 262/81, Coditel SA v. Ciné-Vog Films SA, 1982 E.C.R. 3381, ¶ 20.
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Balancing within Article 101(1), whether we call it a rule of reason
analysis or the ancillary restraints doctrine, offers great possibilities but
little that is tangible and which can be relied upon. This is particularly true
given the CFI’s seeming hostility to a rule of reason, because: “[T]he
creation of the CFI necessarily reduces the ECJ’s control over developments in the system. No longer is there one judicial voice, there are
two.”534 Accordingly, incorporating the promotion of a high level of employment into the test laid out in Article 101(3) will now be considered.
Additionally, in spite of the potential shown by Wouters, the limits of such
potential have yet to be defined, making it a risky road for parties to travel
down if they are seeking exemption of an agreement.
B. Legal Exception Analysis under Article 101(3)
Article 101(3) offers salvation to agreements that would otherwise be
prohibited and therefore void under Article 101(1).535 In order for an
agreement to be excepted under Article 101(3), the agreement must meet
four requirements, two positive and two negative. Positively, it must be
shown that the agreement “contributes to improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress” and
allows “consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.”536 In addition to
these positive requirements, the agreement must not: (a) “impose on the
undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives”; and (b) “afford such undertakings the
possibility of eliminating competition.”537 Both the ECJ538 and the Commission539 have stated that all four conditions must be satisfied in order for
Article 101(3) to except an agreement.
So what is needed for an agreement to meet these requirements? The
first requirement of improvement or progress can be seen in very general
terms as a “benefit ... of objective value to the [Union] as a whole.”540 The
second requirement is that such a benefit must be passed on to consum534

TOWNLEY, supra note 83, at 212.
See TFEU, supra note 4, at art. 101(3).
536
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537
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538
Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax v. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios,
2006 ECR I-11125, ¶ 65 (“The applicability of the exemption provided for in Article
81(3) EC is subject to the four cumulative conditions laid down in that provision.”).
539
Article 81(3) Guidelines, supra note 182, ¶ 42 (“According to settled case law the
four conditions of Article 81(3) are cumulative, i.e. they must all be fulfilled for the
exception rule to be applicable.” (footnote omitted)).
540
WHISH, supra note 24, at 151.
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ers.541 The Commission defines consumers as “all direct or indirect users
of the products covered by the agreement .... In other words, consumers
within the meaning of Article [101(3)] are the customers of the parties to
the agreement and subsequent purchasers.”542 This is a fairly narrow definition; it may well be too narrow to allow the promotion of a high level of
employment to be considered under Article 101(3). The narrowness or
breadth of Article 101(3) will be considered below.543 In order for an
agreement that sought to promote a high level of employment to meet the
third requirement of indispensability, the parties would have to show “that
there are no other economically practicable and less restrictive means”544
of achieving the benefits to employment levels. This test requires the parties to show that there was not another type of less anticompetitive agreement they could have relied upon to achieve the same objective.545 However, “[t]he Commission will not second guess the business judgment of
the parties.”546 The final test is to demonstrate that competition is not
utterly destroyed by the agreement.547
It is questionable if these four tests can be interpreted in such a way as
to balance employment against consumer welfare. This is not easy to answer. Odudu has written that “[i]t remains ‘controversial what exactly
remains to be considered under Article [101(3)].’”548 Whish identifies two
general views of what can be considered under Article 101(3): the “narrow
view” and the “broader view.”549 Under the narrow view, Article 101(3)
can only consider economic efficiency issues, whereas the broader view
allows for a wider range of policy issues to be considered within 101(3).550
In order to determine what may be considered under Article 101(3), an
attempt needs to be made to discover whether the narrow view or the
broader view prevails.
Townley states that “Article [101(3)]’s wording seems too narrow to
include many objectives.”551 On the basis of Article 101(3)’s wording
alone, this author is inclined to agree, particularly when Article 101(3) is
read in conjunction with the Commission’s Article 81(3) Guidelines (the
541
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Guidelines). The Guidelines relentlessly pursue an economic efficiency/consumer welfare standard for the application of Article 101(3).552 The
Guidelines speak of agreements being excepted because of their “positive
economic effects”553 or “pro-competitive effects.”554 This is the language
of consumer welfare purists; while reducing unemployment is likely to
benefit society as a whole, such an objective is unlikely to be considered a
procompetitive effect under a consumer welfare analysis.555 The Guidelines go on to state that “[g]oals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be
taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four
conditions of Article [101](3).”556 This clearly demonstrates that in the
Commission’s opinion there is no room for goals such as Article 9’s promotion of a high level of employment. The Commission’s White Paper
also stated that Article 101 could not “be set aside because of political
considerations.”557
Balancing employment against consumer welfare would probably be
considered a goal that could not be incorporated into an Article 101(3)
assessment in the Commission’s post-Guidelines world. However, it has
already been argued that in a post-Lisbon world, competition has been
downgraded as a Union goal.558 It is also important to bear in mind that
the Guidelines are in no way binding on the Union’s courts.559 Once all
this is taken into consideration, it can be submitted that the Guidelines and
their pursuit of a sole consumer welfare standard was a temporary aberration.
In support of this we can look back prior to the Guidelines, and see examples of agreements that promoted employment being excepted. In Metro-SB-Grossmärkte, the ECJ held:
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[T]he establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period constitutes a stabilizing factor with regard to the provision of employment
which, since it improves the general conditions of production, especially when the market conditions are unfavourable, comes within the
framework of the objectives to which reference may be had pursuant to
Article [101(3)].560

Therefore, the ECJ was able to allow an agreement because it promoted employment; however, Faull and Nikpay state that the economic
benefit was not the promotion of employment per se, but because employment improved production.561 Nevertheless, the effect is the same.
Similarly, in Matra Hachette, the CFI stated that the Commission did not
consider the promotion of employment as a legitimate consideration under
Article 101(3).562 However, the Commission excepted the Joint Venture
between Ford and Volkswagen563 under Article 101(3), and the CFI
upheld their decision.564 Faull and Nikpay see Matra Hachette as “confirming the fact that the benefits in question [employment] did not constitute objective benefits within the meaning of Article [101(3)].”565
Arguably Faull and Nikpay are naïve to take the reasoning of the
Commission or the Union Courts at face value. Townley writes:
[T]he Commission is rarely explicit about what it is trying to do; normally fails to quantify any costs or benefits that it considers; and, seldom places its analysis within a wider framework, which would allow
us to intuit what it is seeking to achieve, or to predict its assessment in
future cases.566

That being the case, it seems possible that the Commission (with the
exception of the sole consumer welfare years) was always following a
broader approach to Article 101(3) but may have preferred to shoehorn
their analysis into a narrower reasoning.
From a narrow perspective, there still remains the issue of benefiting
consumers under Article 101(3), though it may be difficult to show that an
agreement that promotes employment will be of benefit to consumers.
Monti writes that, when the Commission has sought to use Article 101(3)
560
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to except agreements that have a public policy benefit, it has done so by
“substitut[ing] the consumers’ interest with the interest of the public.”567
Monti goes on to write that such benefits of general public interest “can
only be considered under the first positive condition of Article [101(3)]
and not the second.”568 In summary, the argument Monti advances is that
“construing [the second positive requirement] in this way is problematic,
because it collapses Article [101(3)]’s first and second tests.”569 This author would submit that this wider interpretation is potentially helpful, but
would mean that if consumer benefit is synonymous with consumer welfare, then it cannot be considered under Article 101(3) but must be considered elsewhere in Article 101. The problem that arises with a blinkered
focus on consumer welfare is that it ignores society as a whole and individuals when they act as producers.
This broader recognition of consumers was most famously employed
by the Commission in CECED, where environmental benefits of an
agreement that would accrue to the EU as a whole were considered to
outweigh the anticompetitive fact that the price of washing machines was
increased for consumers.570 The Commission stated: “Such environmental
results for society would adequately allow consumers a fair share of the
benefits even if no benefits accrued to individual purchasers of machines.”571 It could be proposed that the same broad argument can be
made for the promotion of a high level of employment; increasing employment has a number of benefits for society as a whole, which may
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of such an agreement.
Arguably, a broad reading of Article 101(3) in general, and the promotion of a high level of employment in particular, is not as far-fetched as it
first appears. In Métropole Télévision, the CFI made the following broad
statement: “[I]n the context of an overall assessment, the Commission is
entitled to base itself on considerations connected with the pursuit of the
public interest in order to grant exemption under Article [101(3)].”572
Townley argues that this statement is wide enough to “incorporate the
objectives pursued by the policy-linking clauses into the Article [101(3)]
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test.”573 Furthermore, Townley states that industrial policy (which would
include the promotion of employment) “is one of the most heavily used
objectives in the Article [101(3)] balance.”574 Townley goes on to state
that industrial policy is so important to the EU that it can trump not only
consumer welfare but Article 173(3) TFEU575—which prohibits industrial
policy from being used as the basis for distorting competition. Examples
of the promotion of employment, based on a broad reading of Article
101(3), have allowed employment to be recognized as a legitimate objective of an agreement by the ECJ in Metro-SB-Grossmärkte576 and the
Commission in Ford/Volkswagen577 and Stichting Baksteen.578 Additionally, in Piau, the CFI held that qualitative579 restrictions, limiting the number of agents for soccer players, were entitled to be excepted by the Commission because they contributed “to promoting economic progress.”580
This was an employment-related decision because it was concerned with
managing the short playing careers of professional soccer players. The
Piau decision seems to further highlight that employment is a relevant
factor—one that the Commission and the European Courts will consider.
Finally, in Comité Central d’Entreprise de la Société Anonyme Vittel, the
CFI stated, quoting from the Merger Regulation (an issue in that case),
that: “[T]he Commission must place its appraisal within the general
framework of the achievement of the fundamental objectives ... including
that of strengthening the Community’s economic and social cohesion.”581
Furthermore, the fact that employee organizations “have a relevant interest
with respect to the social considerations which may in appropriate cases
be taken into account by the Commission in the context of its appraisal of
whether the concentration is lawful from the point of view of Community
law.”582 Despite the fact that the CFI dismissed the case on the basis that
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the plaintiffs’ procedural rights were not violated,583 the Vittel case further
demonstrates the court’s willingness to consider employment as a legitimate ground in competition cases. Therefore, this Article suggests that
these precedents, reinforced by the policy-linking clauses of the TFEU,
insist that employment is a relevant factor that must be balanced against
consumer welfare, and that the appropriate place to consider employment
is under Article 101(3).
C. A Bifurcated Balancing Approach
It is now established that the Article 9 goal of the promotion of a high
level of employment must be considered when assessing an agreement
under Article 101. Furthermore, the correct forum for considering employment and industrial policy is Article 101(3), as part of a broad reading
which combines the two positive tests. To adopt such a broad reading is
arguably not controversial: the Commission used this approach in
CECED, and Townley states that the Union Courts have moved away
“from the literal wording [of Article 101(3)] altogether and conduct[ ] a
general public policy test there.”584 In fact, it can be argued that what is
controversial is the Commission’s insistence in the Guidelines that a consumer welfare goal must be the sole goal of Article 101.585
However, under the present structure of Article 101(3), the two positive tests must be read broadly and in conjunction; this means that consumer welfare is submerged into a general societal welfare test and therefore, consumer welfare is not considered at all.586 Given that consumer
welfare is a necessary component of competition law, the question becomes where in Article 101 consumer welfare should be considered.
Townley writes that the appropriate place for considering consumer
welfare is under Article 101(1),587 with other public policy goals being
balanced against consumer welfare under Article 101(3).588 Does Article
101(1)’s wording allow a consumer welfare test to take place? The key
words in Article 101(1) are: “[Agreements] hav[ing] as their object or
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
internal market.”589 Competition is not defined in either of the Union trea583
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ties; indeed, at various points competition is referred to as “free,”590
“fair”591 and “that competition is not distorted.”592 It is at least open to
question whether such references to competition are even compatible.
Therefore, just as the U.S. federal judiciary created the aims of the Sherman Act, the Union Courts can define the meaning of competition.
In the CFI judgment of GlaxoSmithKline, it was held that: “[T]he objective assigned to Art. [101(1) TFEU] ... is to prevent undertakings, by
restricting competition between themselves or with third parties, from
reducing the welfare of the final consumer of the products in question.”593
However, on appeal of the CFI’s decision, the ECJ stated that “that neither
the wording of art. [101(1) TFEU] nor the case-law lend support to such a
position”594 (that is, a sole consumer welfare goal). The ECJ then went on
to state that Article 101 “aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing,
competition as such.”595 That being the case, it can be argued that Article
101(1) has two aims, both grounded in economics: first, the consumer
welfare test; and second, ensuring a market structure that maintains and
promotes workable competition. Such a dual aim for Article 101(1) would
be in keeping with the ECJ’s GlaxoSmithKline judgment, and would free
up Article 101(3) for non-economic concerns. It would then fall to the
decision-maker to determine if the non-economic benefits of an agreement
trumped whatever the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were under
Article 101(1).
One final point: Article 101(3) has been described as a “formalized
and specialized rule of reason.”596 This is the approach taken by the
Commission,597 supported by the CFI in Métropole,598 and approved of by
commentators.599 However, this is not strictly accurate—Article 101 in its
590
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entirety is the European rule of reason. Unlike the U.S. rule of reason, the
European rule is not entirely an economic efficiency test.600 This author
would submit that, instead, it is a unique test influenced by both economic
analysis and the broader public policy goals of the European Union. The
first stage of the test is an analysis under Article 101(1), where the agreement’s impact in terms of consumer welfare and market structure is assessed. If the decision-maker concludes that the agreement has no anticompetitive impact upon either consumer welfare or the structure of the
market, then the agreement is allowed and no further assessment is required. However, if the agreement does fall foul of Article 101(1) because
of its anticompetitive effects, the agreement may be saved (excepted) if
the parties can prove, under Article 101(3), that the agreement serves a
legitimate public policy goal. For the purposes of this Article, that goal is
the promotion of a high level of employment. Finally, it falls to the decision-maker to determine if the public benefit under Article 101(3) outweighs the consumer welfare detriment under Article 101(1). Based on
case law,601 previous Commission decisions,602 and the strengthening of
policy-linking clauses combined with the downgrading of competition as a
Union aim,603 it can be submitted that it is likely an agreement that significantly impacts employment will be excepted.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to demonstrate that consumer welfare and
broader public policy goals, specifically employment, should and must be
balanced under Article 101. By interpreting Article 101 in such a way that
consumer welfare is balanced against employment not only would be in
keeping with the structure of the EU Treaties, but it would also, arguably,
achieve social welfare. Social welfare would be achieved because balancing consumer welfare against employment would mean that competition
law considered the individual as both a consumer and producer, without
all benefits accruing overwhelmingly to either side.
The introduction of Article 9 TFEU and the Article 7 TFEU integration clause means that employment has been established as a goal that
must be considered under Article 101.604 To try and claim that Article 101
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should be purely concerned with economic efficiency is to ignore EU
goals such as employment, and would be wholly inconsistent with the
structure of the EU Treaties. It is because of this treaty structure that the
EU is unique and, as such, competition provisions, such as Article 101, are
compelled to consider broader aims than mere economic efficiency.
The holistic path that Article 101 is destined to tread because of the integration clauses and the ECJ’s teleological approach differs substantially
from U.S. antitrust law. As such, the chances of convergence between the
two regimes are negligible. However, the EU’s multiple values approach
might arguably serve as a better example for nations or international organizations looking to develop their own competition regimes than U.S.
antitrust. This is because the EU’s embrace of multiple values is more
flexible than U.S. antitrust and more capable of adapting to different path
dependencies, whereas the American insistence on a sole consumer welfare goal does not take into account cultural differences or varying national attitudes towards the benefits of the free-market. In short, the EU has
developed a stakeholder theory of competition law which is capable of
representing the interests of individuals as consumers and producers, and
society as a whole.
In terms of where this balancing of consumer welfare and employment
should occur, this Article proposes that consumer welfare, along with the
other economic concerns of Article 101, should be considered under
101(1) because this would leave 101(3) free to consider the public policy
goals of the EU Treaties. Although such an analytical approach would
necessitate a broad reading of Article 101(3), such a broad reading has
been supported by the Commission605 and the Courts,606 and offers a clarity that an Article 101(1) rule of reason-type analysis does not afford.
While Wouters607 and Meca-Medina608 offer an appealing possibility of a
public policy balancing test under Article 101(1), the courts have not defined the limits of this rule of reason or ancillary restraints doctrine. Until
the limits of Wouters are defined by further case law, Wouters offers only
the temptation of what might be.
That is not to say that the bifurcated balancing approach this Article
proposes is without controversy or difficulty. For instance, those subscrib605
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ing to a narrow economic-efficiency reading of Article 101(3) will continue to insist that there is no place for public policy considerations with
Article 101,609 or EU competition law in general. However, as suggested
towards the beginning of this Article,610 the application of competition law
is inherently controversial. It is not possible to give a competition regime
aims without investing in that regime political values that some will find
unpalatable.
Economic efficiency has a vital role to play in the analysis of firm
conduct, but a consumer welfare approach is not value-free. Therefore,
judging firm conduct by a consumer welfare standard alone does not give
us the complete picture. This is particularly true of the EU, given the integration clauses, which insist upon the permeation of all EU decisionmaking with their myriad of values. This author concludes that the bifurcated balancing approach offers the best mechanism for weighing economic efficiency goals against broader policy considerations, such as
employment.
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